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THE ROTTEN FOUNDATIONS OF SECURITIZATION
DAVID GRAY CARLSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
A bankruptcy trustee is supposed to maximize debtor assets
for the benefit of unsecured creditors. Often this task is achieved
at the expense of the secured creditors. If a bankruptcy trustee
can obtain control over collateral, the trustee might be able to
use it without paying rent or interest to the lender. According to
the U.S. Supreme Court, only oversecured creditors are worthy
of postpetition interest.' Undersecured creditors are not.2 To be
sure, the lender is entitled to adequate protection for the collat-
eral contributed to debtor rehabilitation,3 but lenders are skep-
tical of this right and certainly hostile to the idea that, for the
duration of the bankruptcy proceeding, the lender, if
undersecured, is unable to earn income on its investment.4
In the 1980s, disdain of bankruptcy jurisdiction led financial
markets to generate a multibillion dollar practice neologized as
"securitization."5 The goal of securitization is for a debtor, called
an "originator," to sell accounts, chattel paper, general intangi-
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
Thanks to Tom Plank, Jeanne L. Schroeder, Paul Shupack, and Bill Widen for read-
ing earlier drafts of this Article.
1. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994); Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 475 (1993).
2. See United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
372 (1988).
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e).
4. See STANDARD & POOR'S CORP., S&P'S STRUCTURED FINANCE CRTRIA 68-69
(1988).
5. The name "securitization" undoubtedly refers to the act of rendering fit for the
securities market short-term collateral that otherwise would be viewed as inade-
quate. For an attempt at a definition of securitization, see Joseph C. Shenker & An-
thony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers,
69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1374-75 (1991). Shenker and Colletta present a treasure trove
of information on securitization, including its venerable history. See id. at 1369-429.
What occurred in the 1980s was merely a revitalization of techniques that have long
been known, understood, and used. See id. at 1372-73.
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bles, or instruments to a bankruptcy-remote corporation (some-
times called a "special purpose vehicle" or SPV) set up for the
sole purpose of buying this property.6 The SPV raises funds by
selling debt or perhaps equity participations in the financial
markets.7 The only obligation of the SPV is the debt or equity
obligations the SPV issued to raise funds.8 The assets are pre-
cisely what the SPV has bought from the originator-usually
heavily guaranteed by the originator's promise to buy back or
replace bad accounts.9 The form of the transfer from the origi-
nator to the SPV-a sale-is supposed to prove that no bank-
ruptcy court can ever claim jurisdiction over the assets again.1"
To be more precise, section 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
indicates that the bankruptcy estate includes "all legal or equi-
table interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of the case."1 If a debtor were to convey to the SPV a mere lien
on accounts 2 or chattel paper,"3 the assets would not have es-
caped bankruptcy jurisdiction. 4 In such a case, the debtor re-
tains an equity interest in the collateral--enough to justify
bankruptcy jurisdiction. 5 But since the debtor sells the ac-
counts, the debtor supposedly retains nothing. 6
This alleged nonrelationship between debtor and thing sold is
sometimes said to be the very key to securitization. 7 If the rat-
6. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 133, 135 (1994).
7. See id. at 135.
8. See id. at 135-36.
9. To add to the security of the deal, this guarantee is sometimes enhanced with
a bank letter of credit or the like. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 5, at 1376.
10. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 24-25 (1996)
(discussing asset securitization as a method for judgment-proofing).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994).
12. See U.C.C. § 9-106 (1995) ("'Account' means any right to payment for goods
sold or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or
chattel paper, whether or not it has been earned by performance.").
13. See id. § 9-105(1)(b) ("'Chattel paper' means a writing or writings which evi-
dence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific
goods.").
14. See Stephen I. Glover, Structured Finance Goes Chapter 11: Asset Securitiza-
tion by Reorganizing Companies, 47 Bus. LAw. 611, 621 (1992).
15. See id. at 621 & n.29.
16. See id. at 619, 621.
17. See Peter F. Culver, The Dawning of Securitization, PROB. & PROP.,
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ing agencies were to perceive a mere hypothetical legal risk of
bankruptcy jurisdiction, then the transaction would supposedly
become more expensive or, it is sometimes alleged, impossible.'"
These are empirical predictions, of course. One is skeptical that
mere hypothetical risks should be worth so much in the market.
Nevertheless, securitization theorists have assumed that the
cost of funds depends on the purely hypothetical question of
bankruptcy jurisdiction. 9
The burden of foreclosing any possibility of bankruptcy juris-
diction devolves into some very technical concepts of commercial
law. First, lawyers must distinguish between (a) liens upon and
(b) sales of intangible personal property."0 Clearly, the lien is
governed by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).2"
The commercial world agrees-without careful attention to the
text of the Bankruptcy Code-that property encumbered by mere
liens is subject fully to bankruptcy jurisdiction. It is assumed
that the spirit-if not the language-of the Bankruptcy Code re-
quires the modern secured lender to contribute the use of collat-
eral to the rehabilitation of debtors.22 It is for this very reason
that securitization abandons secured lending and takes up the
sale of intangible property as its mode of operation.'
MarlApr. 1994, at 34, 34.
18. See Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale of Accounts and
Chattel Paper Under the U.C.C. and the Effects of Violating a Fundamental Drafting
Principle, 26 CONN. L. REv. 397, 457 (1994); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are
Greater Than the Whole: How Securitization of Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize
Structured Finance and Open the Capital Markets to Middle-Market Companies, 1993
COLU . BUS. L. REV. 139, 143-45. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Structured
Finance: The New Way to Securitize Assets, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 607 (1990) [herein-
after Schwarcz, Structured Finance] (arguing that removing assets from the
originator's bankruptcy estate to an SPV reduces the cost and risk of fund raising).
19. See LoPucki, supra note 10, at 29.
20. See Glover, supra note 14, at 621.
21. See U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (1995). Certain security interests in personal property
are omitted for political reasons from UCC coverage. See, e.g., id. § 9-104 (excluding
liens arising from landlord-tenant relations, mechanics liens, and employee liens). In
addition, federal law sometimes governs, as in the case of ship mortgages. See id. at
cmt. 1.
22. See generally Elliott D. Levin & Phyllis McGurk, Who Gets the Goodies: What
Happens to the Enhancement of the Secured Parties' Collateral Post-Petition, 102
COM. L.J. 55 (1997) (discussing distribution of collateral in bankruptcies).
23. See Glover, supra note 14, at 621.
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Second, lawyers must distinguish between the sale of accounts
and chattel paper and the sale of other intangible property. Arti-
cle 9 of the UCC governs the sale of accounts and chattel paper in
addition to governing the security interests on all personal prop-
erty.' The sale of general intangibles' or instruments"5 is not
governed by Article 9 but by the common law of assignment."7
A huge portion of the securitization trade involves the sale of
accounts and chattel paper. It is admitted that Article 9 governs
the sale of this kind of personal property from the originator to
the SPV.' Yet the securitizers allege that Article 9's jurisdic-
tion over the sale of accounts and chattel paper does not imply
that the sold accounts are subject to bankruptcy jurisdiction. 9
Even if personal property subject to security interests is subject
to bankruptcy jurisdiction,"0 sold property supposedly is not."
24. See U.C.C. § 9-102. But see id. § 9-104 (noting minor exceptions to subject
matter jurisdiction). In addition, a security interest in securities is governed by Arti-
cle 8, not Article 9. See generally U.C.C. art. 8 (addressing investment securities).
Article 8 has recently been redrafted to give Article 9 back its jurisdiction over
pledges of securities that it lost in the regrettable 1978 amendments to the UCC.
See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radi-
cal Reform of Secured Lending on Wall Street, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 291 (ex-
ploring changes to Articles 8 and 9 of the UCC proposed by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, in 1994).
25. See U.C.C. § 9-106 ("'General intangibles' means any personal property (includ-
ing things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instru-
ments, investment property ... and money.").
26. See id. § 9-105(1)(i) ("'Instrument' means a negotiable instrument ...or any
other writing which evidences a right to the payment of money and is not itself a
security agreement or lease and is of a type which is in ordinary course of business
transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.").
27. See id. § 9-102(1)(b) (applying Article 9 to the sale of accounts or chattel paper,
but not including general intangibles or instruments within Article 9's jurisdiction).
28. See id.
29. See Steven 0. Weise, U.C.C. Article 9: Personal Property Secured Transactions,
49 BUS. LAW. 1867, 1870 (1994).
30. See Dewhirst v. Citibank (Ariz.) (In re Contractors Equip. Supply Co.), 861
F.2d 241, 245 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that encumbered accounts are part of the
bankruptcy estate).
31. See Robert D. Aicher & William J. Fellerhoff, Characterization of a Transfer of
Receivables As a Sale or a Secured Loan upon Bankruptcy of the Transferor, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 181, 182-84 (1991); Peter V. Pantaleo et al., Rethinking the Role of Re-
course in the Sale of Financial Assets, 52 BUS. LAW. 159, 161 (1996); Thomas E.
Plank, The True Sale of Loans and the Role of Recourse, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV.
287, 307-08 (1991) (arguing that payment of the full value, not the existence of re-
course, should constitute the border between sales of and security interests in ac-
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In Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Re-
serve, Inc.),32 Judge Bobby Baldock set off an international fire
storm of rage and indignation with the following humble state-
ment: "The impact of applying Article 9 to Rimmer's account is
that Article 9s treatment of accounts sold as collateral would
place Rimmer's account within the property of [the] bankruptcy
estate.""
This statement-quite unnecessary to the holding of the
case-has been denounced in the financial press and in the law
reviews.' The Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC has is-
sued a "commentary" purporting to advise the federal courts on
their own jurisdiction, in the hope of providing ammunition to
the friends of securitization against the mere idea that bank-
ruptcy courts may exert control over securitized assets.35 Mean-
while, the rating agencies have decided to ignore Octagon Gas,
when the originator is outside the Tenth Circuit, on the theory
that it is "bad" law. 6
This Article will argue that, in spite of the hue and cry through
the streets of corporate finance, the Octagon Gas case was decided
rightly: on its facts, its dictum, and its policy implications.
Now many reading this Article will protest that, since the
market supposedly reacts to merely hypothetical risks, the bare
suggestion that securitization's premises are false will cause an
originator's cost of funds to increase. Hence, mere investigation
of law is a mistake, on wealth maximization principles. To such
claims, the author is obviously insouciant. First, whether prices
rise is an empirical prediction. If the rating agencies determine
that the actual risk of an originator's bankruptcy is small, the
rating agencies, bound in by competitive pressure, will eventu-
counts and chattel paper); Schwarcz, Structured Finance, supra note 18, at 621-27;
Peter L. Mancini, Note, Bankruptcy and the U.C.C. as Applied to Securitization:
Characterizing a Mortgage Loan Transfer As a Sale or a Secured Loan, 73 B.U. L.
REV. 873, 876-77 (1993).
32. 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993).
33. Id. at 955.
34. See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, When A Sale of Accounts Is Not A Sale: A Cri-
tique of Octagon Gas, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 45 (1994).
35. See PERmLANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE U.C.C., AMERICAN L. INST., COM-
MENTARY No. 14 (SECTION 9-102(1)(B) (1994)) [hereinafter P.E.B. COMIMENTARY].
36. See Plank, supra note 18, at 459 n.278.
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ally issue a fair rating at or near the current risk, so that, in the
long run, the price of funds will not rise. As securitization usu-
ally involves highly solvent originators, an increase in price is by
no means a foregone conclusion. Second, if truly risky origina-
tors find their cost of funds rising, this may in fact have desir-
able social consequences. Risk of bankruptcy constitutes what
economists style an externality. A higher interest rate for future
funds may discourage a firm from exposing the public to further
externalities. As such, higher interest rates are a social good,
even if privately regrettable. It is the surest sign of bad econom-
ic theory to equate higher private costs with social inefficiency.
Though the law reviews are full to overflowing with suggestions
for reducing transaction costs in the name of the public good,
sophisticated economists know better.5 7
The critique that follows will strike many as rarified indeed.
The critique points out that, when we adhere to the words of the
Bankruptcy Code and not to what people say about those words
or what they wish the Code said, bankruptcy jurisdiction turns
on whether any debtor interest in a thing exists-no matter how
remote or improbable. In short, the distinction between bank-
37. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24
REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956). A recent study of securitization suggests that, like se-
cured lending in general, securitization is inefficient. Securitization, in this account,
serves only to export uncompensated risk to unsecured creditors, thereby enriching
debtors. See Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Alloca-
tion, 72 TrL. L. REv. 101 (1997). It is useless to speculate on the efficiency of law
for the reasons demonstrated by Lipsey and Lancaster, supra. But Professor Frost
makes a particularly disastrous choice in invoking the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance
hypothesis with regard to the cross-elasticity between secured and unsecured credit.
See Frost, supra, at 105. To be sure, this is a time-honored move. See Thomas H.
Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors,
88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1154-55 (1979) (invoking, for the first time, Modigliani-Miller in
such a context); see also Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities:
A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981) (developing this idea). In
fact, Modigliani-Miller assumptions, transposed to the cross-elasticity between secured
and unsecured credit, strictly imply Ponzi schemes-unproductive enterprises that
borrow themselves into insolvency. It is the height of irony that, for almost twenty
years, law and economics has assessed the efficiency of secured lending by unwit-
tingly studying the dynamics of Ponzi schemes. This amazing fact is quite sufficient
to undermine confidence in economic science as it has been applied in the law
schools, and yet is fully proved in David Gray Carlson, Secured Lending as a Zero
Sum Game, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. (forthcoming 1998).
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ruptcy jurisdiction does not turn on the lien-sale distinction, as
is usually supposed. Rather, even sold accounts are subject to
bankruptcy jurisdiction, provided some "legal or equitable" debt-
or property interest in the thing sold can be located. If some hy-
pothetical connection between debtor and thing can be located,
then bankruptcy jurisdiction is justified.
Because we traffic in the hypothetical, whatever is possible is
real. The exercise we are about to undertake will resemble the
fantastic excesses of the Rule Against Perpetuities with which
all first-year law students are familiar. Just as contingent future
interests in property are tested according to whether octogenari-
an women can have children or great-grandfathers can have un-
born widows, so we will test sales of accounts and chattel paper
according to the most astonishing hypotheticals, in order to dis-
cover whether debtors have retained some property connection
with the accounts and chattel paper they have sold. If so, then
bankruptcy jurisdiction plausibly exists.
At least three property interests in the debtor exist after the
sale of accounts or chattel paper. First, the debtor retains a pow-
er to convey chattel paper to subsequent purchasers who take
possession in the ordinary course of their business free and clear
of the SPV buyer's rights.38 This is so even after the SPV per-
fects its purchase by filing a financing statement as required by
Article 9.39
The second power is the power to collect. Ordinarily, the SPV
appoints the originator as collecting agent for accounts." The
mere existence of this collecting power constitutes a power to "use"
the accounts-though this power is fiduciary in nature. Neverthe-
less, I will show that the Bankruptcy Code can plausibly be read to
make legal title-held for the benefit of another-the foundation of
bankruptcy jurisdiction.
The third power belongs to the bankruptcy trustee, who is a
hypothetical judicial lien creditor in bankruptcy.4' This strong-
arm power establishes an interest in sold accounts and chattel
38. See U.C.C. § 9-308 (1995).
39. See id. § 9-308(a).
40. This may occur because originators are "loathe to part with control over ongo-
ing relationships with their customers." Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 31, at 182.
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1994).
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paper even after the buyer perfects.42 That the trustee has power
over sold accounts or chattel paper by means of the strong-arm
power is obvious enough when the buyer has not perfected.4 1 It is
equally true that, even after perfection, a future interest belongs
to the trustee.' A close study of Article 9 will reveal that perfec-
tion is never final but always contingent. Every financing state-
ment lapses-either at the end of five years45 or at the end of four
months, if the debtor changes location.46 As a result, creditors
retain a "future interest" in the sold accounts. This future interest
represents the inherent possibility that, in the future, the credi-
tors will regain the present power to sell the accounts again to a
subsequent bona fide purchaser for value.4 v
These property rights may seem slight or insubstantial. If the
Bankruptcy Code clearly made substantiality a test of bankrupt-
cy jurisdiction, then courts could make prudential judgments as
to whether debtor interests in things have sufficient "weight" to
sustain bankruptcy jurisdiction. Yet the Bankruptcy Code does
not make substantiality the test-only mere possibility.48 This
was underscored by the Supreme Court itself in an opinion that
securitization lawyers have studied like Roman augurs riveted
to the entrails of slaughtered chickens, hoping to find there a
harbinger preceding still the fates and a prologue to the omens
coming on.
In United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.,49 the Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) claimed about $92,000 in back taxes." Pursu-
ant to its tax lien, the IRS seized inventory, equipment, vehicles,
and office supplies with a liquidation value of "at most,
$35,000. "51 Even though the value of the debtor's equity inter-
est in the inventory was remote, the debtor-in-possession in
Whiting Pools nevertheless succeeded in asserting bankruptcy
42. See id. § 544(a)(3).
43. See id. § 544; U.C.C. § 9-301.
44. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5).
45. See U.C.C. § 9-403(2).
46. See id. § 9-103(3)(e).
47. See id. § 9-403(2).
48. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (requiring only "any" interest to assert jurisdiction).
49. 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
50. See id. at 199.
51. Id. at 200.
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jurisdiction over the collateral.52 According to Justice Harry
Blackmun, the debtor had a purely hypothetical right to a sur-
plus.5 3 In addition, the IRS had the duty to send a notice to the
debtor that it had levied the inventory." The right of a thing's
owner to receive this fallow notice proved connection enough
between debtor and thing.55 On these thin and wanton reeds
were founded the massy edifice of bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Still, Justice Blackmun, in a footnote to Whiting Pools, did
suggest that some debtor property interests were too tenuous
and giddy a ground for bankruptcy jurisdiction. 5 Trying to ex-
plain why a trustee might be able to use the whole of collateral,
not just the part the debtor owns," Justice Blackmun had to
maintain that section 541(a)(1) was very expansive, but never-
theless some debtor rights were excluded. 5 The excluded rights
were said to be "minor interest[s] such as a lien or bare legal
title."59 In its dicta, Whiting Pools invites courts to figure out
what is major and what is minor. This is precisely the pruden-
tial invitation that securitization needs to survive-if bankrupt-
cy courts will only privilege the footnoted dicta over the fantastic
blackletter holding of the case.
Securitization, therefore, exists uneasily with Whiting Pools.
The holding of Whiting Pools suggests that extremely unimpor-
tant debtor interests-the mere theoretic right to be notified
when radically overencumbered property is taken-sustain
bankruptcy jurisdiction. 0 The dictum in a footnote suggests
that bankruptcy jurisdiction requires "major" debtor interests.6
With regard to the dictum, the Court gave mere examples of
minor interests, without attempting to explain why these inter-
52. See id. at 209-11.
53. See id. at 209.
54. See id. at 201 n.4.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 143-44.
56. See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 204 n.4.
57. Section 541(a)(1) includes only debtor equity in the estate, but Justice
Blackmun was trying to explain why the trustee might use all the collateral-the
encumbered part and the equity as well. See infra text accompanying notes 142-50.
58. See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 204 n.8.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 211-12.
61. See id. at 204 n.8.
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ests are so thin of substance.62
Regardless of whether we follow the holding of or the foot-
notes in Whiting Pools, we cannot say that the words of the
Bankruptcy Code snatch securitized collateral from the ponder-
ous and marble jaws of bankruptcy jurisdiction.' If we examine
only the Bankruptcy Code itself, we find that bankruptcy juris-
diction is founded on any debtor interest in a thing." This is
plenty broad enough to sweep in sold accounts and chattel pa-
per-thanks to Article 9.65 Only the good will of procreditor
judges-that is to say, judicial legislators-can save securitiza-
tion from the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.
But does securitization deserve the good will of bankruptcy
judges? This may be severely questioned. In 1979, Congress rad-
ically extended bankruptcy jurisdiction over secured creditors,
with the idea of forcing them to contribute to the rehabilitation
of debtors.66 Though made to surrender this collateral to bank-
ruptcy trustees, secured parties were given no entitlement to
postpetition interest.67 This uncompensated use of capital can
be viewed as a wealth transfer or tax on secured creditors (the
"Bankruptcy Tax"). Securitization, in contrast, is therefore best
viewed as tax avoidance. In response to securitization, financial
markets have reacted as they always do, by awarding a premi-
um for tax avoidance. The theory of tax avoidance is that the
sale of intangible property leaves no connection between the
debtor and thing. To be sure, the policy winds have turned an-
grily from the dew-dropping prodebtor south to the frozen bosom
of the procreditor north. Many of the amendments to the Bank-
ruptcy Code since 1979 have been designed to level out the
Bankruptcy Code's radical prodebtor bias. 8 Perhaps today's Con-
62. See id.
63. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994).
64. See id. § 541(a)(3)-(5).
65. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) (1995).
66. See discussion infra Part II.
67. See United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
379 (1988) (denying postpetition interest to an undersecured creditor relying on the
plain meaning of section 506 and section 362(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code).
68. For example, the addition of the new subsection 522(f)(3) in 1994 was extremely
procreditor. See David Gray Carlson, Security Interests on Exempt Property After the
1994 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 57, 59 (1996).
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gress in its surly mood would not choose to empower unsecured
creditors and debtors at the expense of secured creditors. Yet it
still remains true that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 re-
mains largely intact. The legislation favors the Bankruptcy Tax
on secured lending that financial markets wish to avoid. At least
the judicial conservatives will agree that, until Congress affir-
matively changes the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code, the creditors ought to subvent debtor rehabilitation by
submitting to the Bankruptcy Tax imposed on them by the
Bankruptcy Code. This applies as much to securitization as to
other forms of secured credit.
This Article will therefore explore the premise that bankrupt-
cy courts have no jurisdiction over property involved in securiti-
zation. First, it will be argued that the Bankruptcy Code itself
compels no such conclusion.6 9 Second, it will be argued that the
Bankruptcy Code's policy favors the participation of the securiti-
zation industry in the rehabilitation of debtors. ° On both for-
mal and policy grounds, therefore, securitization's right to exist
may be sharply questioned."'
In pursuit of these twin goals, Part I of this Article commenc-
es with the statutory foundations of bankruptcy jurisdiction over
the property of third persons. Part II discusses the absolutist
holding and the relativist dictum of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Whiting Pools. Part III examines the ability of securitiza-
tion to survive an absolutist reading of the Bankruptcy Code
and concludes that it cannot. Part IV addresses the policy of the
Bankruptcy Code and concludes that securitization should not
survive, if we take for granted the correctness of the Bankruptcy
Code's spirit of rehabilitating debtors. Part V examines the infa-
mous Octagon Gas case and concludes that it was correctly de-
cided on both its facts as well as on its dictum.
II. BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, secured
creditors ruled the sea like so many pirates, boarding distressed
69. See discussion infra Part IVA-C.
70. See discussion infra Part IV.D-VI.
71. See discussion infra p. 1119.
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debtor vessels to expropriate cargo, forcing these debtors to scut-
tle themselves. But those happy days, when debtors were made a
toast to Neptune, are over. Instead, under the modern Bank-
ruptcy Code, secured creditors find themselves deeply entangled
with their victims in the maelstrom of bankruptcy jurisdiction.72
In the high and palmy days of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
(the "1898 Act"), jurisdiction over collateral was limited. In liqui-
dation cases, the trustee had power over collateral if the debtor
still possessed it, but had none if the collateral had already been
repossessed by a secured party. Even if the trustee began the
liquidation case with possession of the collateral, she could re-
tain and sell the collateral only if some debtor equity existed. If
no debtor equity existed, the secured party could claim that re-
tention of the collateral would cause irreparable harm by deny-
ing interest compensation during the bankruptcy proceeding.
Such irreparable harm was grounds enough to lift the stay that
a court would have instituted in a reorganization case. In reor-
ganization cases, the trustee could, via court order, recapture
collateral already repossessed by a secured creditor, but, as a
practical matter, the trustee could retain collateral only if debtor
equity existed.73
From this procreditor situation under the 1898 Act, bankrupt-
cy jurisdiction underwent "a sea change / Into something rich
and strange."4 Today, section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code em-
powers the bankruptcy trustee to retain all the collateral she
can use.75 Section 363 is a long, rambling provision, replete
with opportunities for the trustee to use and abuse the property
of another on behalf of the unsecured creditors.76
The literal words of the Bankruptcy Code differ in their treat-
72. Ironically, the legislative history states that the Bankruptcy Code was written
.as a significant boon to secured lenders." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 183 (1978) (re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6143.
73. See generally David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 590-96 (1989) (discussing pre-1978 Act law); Mary
Josephine Newborn, Undersecured Creditors in Bankruptcy: Dewsnup, Nobelman, and
the Decline of Priority, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 547 (1993) (comparing lien enforcement
rights of undersecured creditors under the 1898 Act and the Bankruptcy Code).
74. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, act 1, sc. 2.
75. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1994).
76. See id.
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ment of illiquid and liquid collateral-something not often ap-
preciated by lawyers or scholars. According to these literal
words, illiquid collateral is not so clearly within the province of
bankruptcy jurisdiction. The Bankruptcy Code is clear only with
regard to cash collateral. Cash collateral is beyond question
within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, according to the
literal words of the Bankruptcy Code." The following sections
explore these distinctions.
A. Illiquid Collateral
It is universally assumed that, so long as adequate protection
has been supplied," the trustee, in aid of debtor rehabilitation,
can use, sell, or lease any collateral claimed by a secured party
under section 363."9 Oddly, section 363 makes this explicit only
with regard to cash collateral." When it comes to illiquid col-
lateral, section 363(b)(1) says only that the trustee "may use,
sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business,
property of the estate.""'
But is collateral property of the estate? Section 541(a)(1) de-
fines property of the estate as "all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."82
When it comes to collateral, the debtor only owns that part of the
collateral that is not the security interest." Taken literally, the
Bankruptcy Code provides that part of the thing is in the estate
and part of it is out of the estate.' Is it possible to argue that the
security interest is never property of the estate, and, therefore,
the trustee may never interfere with the operation of the security
interest?5 Such an argument overturns the fondest beliefs of the
77. See id. § 363(a).
78. See id. § 363(e).
79. See id. § 363(b)(1).
80. See id. § 363(a).
81. Id. § 363(b)(1) (emphasis added).
82. Id. § 541(a) (emphasis added).
83. See id. § 541(b), (d).
84. See id. § 541.
85. This argument was used to explain, however imperfectly, why the state of Cal-
ifornia was entitled to a preference for unpaid taxes when a state law prohibited the
transfer of any liquor license unless the taxes were paid. See California v. Farmers
Mkts., Inc. (In re Farmers Mkts., Inc.), 792 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1986). In this
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debtors' bar and twenty years of everyday experience.
This statutory problem seems to have drawn the attention of
Justice Blackmun in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.8" In
dictum, Justice Blackmun remarked: "Although these statutes
could be read to limit the estate to those 'interests of the debtor
in property' at the time of the filing of the petition, we view
them as a definition of what is included in the estate, rather
than as a limitation." 7 He further stated:
Section 541(a)(1) speaks in terms of the debtor's "inter-
ests..., in property," rather than property in which the debt-
or has an interest, but this choice of language was not meant
to limit the expansive scope of the section. The legislative
history indicates that Congress intended to exclude from the
estate property of others in which the debtor had some minor
interest such as a lien or bare legal title."
These remarks establish that the bankruptcy estate exceeds the
words of section 541(a). Thus, the estate includes not only the
debtor's interest but also the security interest part of an encum-
bered thing. Under this dictum, since the trustee can use "prop-
erty of the estate," 9 the trustee can use the whole of a secured
party's collateral.
case, Judge Alfred Goodwin ruled that the bankruptcy court could sell the license
over the opposition of the State, but that the State had some sort of charge against
the proceeds-though state law did not appear to say so. See id. at 1404. Relying
upon ROBERT NozIcK's ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974), Judge Goodwin held,
"Because the estate may take no greater interest than that held by the debtor...
the estate takes the license subject to the restrictions imposed on the debtor by its
transferor." Id. at 1403 (citation omitted). That is to say, the debtor's interest in the
license was in the estate, but the State's interest in the license was out of the es-
tate. That a restraint on alienation should equate with a lien on proceeds was a
great leap Judge Goodwin chose to leave unexplained. See id. at 1402-03. The court,
however, did not really decide whether the debtor's limited ownership of the fund
precluded use under section 363(a) or not. See id. at 1404; see also SouthTrust Bank
v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 883 F.2d 991 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that only the
debtor's bare right of possession becomes property of the estate in a conditional sale,
where the seller retains title).
86. 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
87. Id. at 203.
88. Id. at 204 n.8.
89. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1).
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Although the limited nature of section 541(a) has been ex-
plained away by the Supreme Court,90 this precise argument is
routinely used and easily accepted in other contexts. Specifically,
this very same argument-only part of the thing is in the es-
tate-is used to explain why a bankruptcy trustee must surren-
der the res of a constructive trust, or, indeed, any kind of
trust.' Section 541(d) states:
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement
of the case, only legal title and not an equitable interest...
becomes property of the estate ... only to the extent of the
debtor's legal title to such property, but not to the extent of
any equitable interest in such property that the debtor does
not hold.92
This provision is usually cited to mean that constructive trust
property is not part of the estate,93 and therefore cannot be used
under section 363(b),94 yet the provision says no such thing. It
says that the debtor's legal title is property of the estate.95 Now,
if the debtor and the beneficiary of a trust are, roughly speaking,
cotenants of the res of the trust, why can the debtor's bankruptcy
trustee not use this trust property in speculative ventures for the
benefit of the general creditors of the debtor?
90. See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 204 & n.8, 205.
91. See Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 59 (1990) ("Because the debtor does not own
an equitable interest in property he holds in trust for another, that interest is not
'property of the estate.').
92. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d).
93. See, e.g., Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308 (1991); Begier, 496 U.S. at 59;
Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 205 n.10 (contrasting section 541(d), which excludes trust
property, with section 541(a), which, though identically worded, does not exclude col-
lateral); Southmark Corp. v. Grosz (In re Southmark Corp.), 49 F.3d 1111, 1117 (5th
Cir. 1995); cf City of Farrell v. Sharon Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 92, 101-03 (3d Cir.
1994) (holding open the possibility that trust funds could have been transferred to
secured parties free and clear of trust, in which case the trust funds would be cash
collateral). For cases expelling trust property from the bankrupt estate, see Empire
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Gingold (In re Real Estate W. Ventures, L.P.), 170 B.R. 736, 744
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993) (holding that security deposits from tenants are required to
be segregated from debtor property); In re All-Way Servs., Inc., 73 B.R. 556, 564
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987) (holding that a withholding tax is not subject to turnover).
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b).
95. See id. § 541(a)(1).
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Such a thought is monstrous, and so, in default of a good an-
swer, it is usually asserted that the equitable part of the res is
simply dehors the estate and cannot be used beneficially for the
unsecured creditors. Thus, in XL/Datacomp, Inc. v. Wilson (In re
Omegas Group, Inc.),9" Judge Alice Batchelder wrote: "A debtor
that served prior to bankruptcy as trustee of an express trust
generally has no right to the assets kept in trust,97 and the
trustee in bankruptcy must fork them over to the beneficiary."
98
This is what she writes of express trusts.99 Where the trust is
implied in law-i.e., a constructive trust--Judge Batchelder
writes: "Nowhere in the Bankruptcy Code does it say, 'property
held by the debtor subject to a constructive trust is excluded
from the debtor's estate."""0 Judge Batchelder then provides a
radical theory of constructive trusts-they do not arise until a
judicial decree declaring the trust arises:' °'
We think that § 541(d) simply does not permit a claimant in
the position of Datacomp to persuade the bankruptcy court to
impose the remedy of constructive trust for alleged fraud
committed against it by the debtor in the course of their busi-
ness dealings, and thus to take ahead of all creditors, and
indeed, ahead of the trustee. Because a constructive trust,
unlike an express trust, is a remedy, it does not exist until a
plaintiff obtains a judicial decision finding him to be entitled
to a judgment "impressing" defendant's property or assets
with a constructive trust. Therefore, a creditor's claim of enti-
tlement to a constructive trust is not an "equitable interest"
in the debtor's estate existing prepetition, excluded from the
estate under § 541(d).102
This holding, which seems to be asserted as a matter of federal
96. 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994).
97. Notice the imprecision of this claim. Of course, trustees have legal title-and
the power to convey good title to bona fide purchasers.
98. Omegas, 16 F.3d at 1449.
99. See id. (discussing the limited analogy between constructive and express
trusts).
100. Id. at 1448.
101. See id. at 1449 (contending that a constructive trust is a legal fiction that re-
quires judicial action to exist).
102. Id. at 1451.
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bankruptcy law,' ° spells the end of any constructive trust in
bankruptcy, if it is followed."' Interestingly, at least part of
Judge Batchelder's theory is that section 541(d) fails to expel
constructive trust property from the estate."5 Hence, the ne-
cessity of a federal override of state law.
At least the express trust was expelled from the bankruptcy
estate, according to Judge Batchelder, because section 541(d)
brings only the legal title to the property into the bankruptcy
estate under section 541(a).' Since the trustee can only use
property of the estate under section 363(b), the trustee cannot
use the beneficial interest of a trust.' 7 Yet this same argu-
ment applies just as well to illiquid collateral encumbered by
security interests. If the beneficial interest of a trust is beyond
the estate, then so is the security interest. But, in spite of the
common position of trust beneficiaries and secured creditors, it
is universally assumed, with no grounding in the Bankruptcy
Code, that bankruptcy trustees can use collateral for the benefit
of unsecured creditors, although the corpus of a trust cannot be
so used.'
Clearly, there exists some extra statutory principle that dis-
tinguishes beneficiaries of trusts from secured creditors. What
might this principle be? Judge Stephen Gerling usefully sug-
gested that the distinction has to do with appreciation value."9
When a creditor claims any sort of lien on property that goes up
in value, the creditor's immediate liquidation of such property
103. Judge Batchelder is not perfectly clear about this, but she did write: "The eq-
uities of bankruptcy are not the equities of the common law. Constructive trusts are
anathema to the equities of bankruptcy since they take from the estate, and thus
directly from competing creditors, not from the offending debtor." Id. at 1452 (foot-
note omitted); see In re Dow Corning Corp., 192 B.R. 428, 435-41 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1996) (reading Omegas as adopting a new federal rule against constructive trusts).
104. See Omegas, 16 F.3d at 1452-53; Dow Corning Corp., 192 B.R. at 441.
105. See Omegas, 16 F.3d at 1451.
106. See id. at 1448-49.
107. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1994).
108. See Wayne Rodney, Note, The Non-Traceable 7501 Tax Trust and Bankruptcy
Superpriority, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 449, 453-54 (1992).
109. Cf. In re Amodio, 155 B.R. 622, 625 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1993) (distinguishing
between the trustee's ability to recapture tangible property seized prepetition and
intangible property, concluding that the trustees ability to recapture intangible prop-
erty rests in its value to the estate).
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effectively deprives the debtor, and her unsecured creditors, of
any potential upside."' The secured creditor must therefore
suffer the law's delay and the insolence of office because bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction hopes to nurture appreciation value in favor
of unsecured creditors. In comparison, the beneficial owners of
trust property are not subject to bankruptcy jurisdiction because
they, not the debtor, own the cozening hope of appreciation val-
ue."' If trust property goes up in value, the fiduciary does not
keep the surplus but rather the beneficiary enjoys the in-
crease."' This aspect of equitable property interests keeps it
outside of bankruptcy jurisdiction.
This distinction captures the spirit of the Bankruptcy Code's
legislative history, even though that spirit is articulated poorly
in the language of the statute itself. Indeed, read literally, noth-
ing in the Bankruptcy Code subjects any third parties claiming
illiquid property to bankruptcy jurisdiction.
B. Cash Collateral
The above suggestion-that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code
clearly subjects secured creditors to bankruptcy jurisdiction-is
not valid with regard to cash collateral. The statutory language
governing cash collateral differs from that which governs illiquid
collateral. According to section 363(a), "cash collateral" means
cash and the like "in which the estate and an entity other than
the estate have an interest.""' The trustee may use "cash col-
lateral"-defined as both the debtor equity and the security
interest" 4-if the secured party consents or if the court so
orders. 5 Section 363(a) expressly states that the trustee may
use the whole of the collateral-the secured party's portion and
110. Cf. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 541 (allowing the trustee to assume executory contracts,
the benefit of which flows to the estate).
111. See id. §§ 363, 726 (stating that the trustee may use, sell, or lease property of
the estate for distribution to creditors, paying secured creditors with any remainder
divided pro rata among unsecured creditors).
112. See id.
113. Id. § 363(a).
114. See id.
115. See id. § 363(c)(2).
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the debtor's portion."' Ironically, when collateral is illiquid,
there is no such explicit assurance. Instead, section 363(b)(1)
indicates that the trustee can use only the debtor's portion."
Those hoping to rationalize the Bankruptcy Code's disparate
treatment of liquid and illiquid collateral might wish to make
these additional points. First, if the trustee has the power to sell
illiquid collateral free and clear of liens under section
363(f)(3),"8 the trustee can freely change illiquid collateral into
cash collateral, thereby taking advantage of the broader "use"
power over cash."' The ability to render illiquid property into
cash renders the distinction between liquid and illiquid collater-
al irrelevant; as in chemistry, the distinction between liquids
and solids is overrated. 2 ' In addition, it also might be ven-
tured that the automatic stay prevents a secured party from
repossessing collateral.' 2' Pending repossession, the debtor can
lawfully "use" and even depreciate it. 2 ' The automatic stay ef-
fectively prevents a secured party from exploiting her right to
repossess, even if the security interest is conceived as being out-
side the bankruptcy estate.' s
The problem with such points is that they apply equally to ben-
eficiaries of trusts as to secured creditors. The trustee has the
power to sell free and clear of equitable interests,"2 and the au-
tomatic stay applies just as much to trust beneficiaries as it does
to secured creditors." One must conclude that the Bankruptcy
116. See id. § 363(a).
117. See id. § 363(b)(1).
118. See id. § 363(f)(3).
119. See id. § 363(a), (0.
120. Section 363(f)(3), however, probably only permits sales free and clear when the
price received is greater than the aggregate amounts of all claims of the affected
secured parties. See David Gray Carlson, Undersecured Claims Under Bankruptcy
Code Sections 506(a) and 1111(b): Second Looks at Judicial Valuations of Collateral,
6 BANKR. DEv. J. 253, 260-63 (1989).
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
122. See id. § 363; Carlson, supra note 120, at 260-63.
123. See 11 U.S.C. § 363.
124. See id. § 363(f)(1) (allowing a trustee to sell free and clear if "applicable
nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear").
125. See First Nat'l Bank v. Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp. II (In re Hurricane
Elkhorn Coal Corp. II), 32 B.R. 737, 741 (W.D. Ky. 1983), affd, 763 F.2d 188 (6th
Cir. 1985). The trustee of an express or constructive trust cannot lawfully use prop-
erty except for the benefit of the cestui que trust. The automatic stay, standing
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Code, in its current state, is not very coherent in its theory of
bankruptcy jurisdiction over the property of others.'26 It requires
judicial supersession to meet the goal of taxing secured creditors
while leaving beneficial owners of fiduciary property alone.
III. WHITING POOLS
A. Its Absolutism
If the trustee can use, sell, or lease collateral under section
363, then the trustee can wrest custody of it from secured credi-
tors who have repossessed it-a vast increase in the power that
bankruptcy trustees have over secured parties. The operative
statute that allows the trustee to obtain repossessed collateral is
section 542(a), which provides:
Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an
entity, other than a custodian, in possession, custody, or con-
trol, during the case, of property that the trustee may use,
sell, or lease under section 363 of this title... shall deliver
to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value of
such property, unless such property is of inconsequential val-
ue or benefit to the estate.
Although broadly written, the section does sometimes let se-
cured parties escape jurisdiction of the bankruptcy trustee if
they have already repossessed the collateral. 12 For example, in
a liquidation case in which there is no debtor equity, the trustee
probably cannot "use, sell, or lease" the property under section
363, and so section 542(a) does not authorize a turnover."m
alone, cannot justify use of trust property under section 363, although section
363(a)'s definition of cash collateral, if read literally, does indeed justify use of trust
funds.
126. See supra Part II.
127. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a). The exceptions in subsections (c) and (d) defend good faith
transfers by the possessor of debtor property without knowledge of the bankruptcy
petition and premium payments to life insurance companies. See id. § 542(c)-(d).
128. See, e.g., In re Amodio, 155 B.R. 622, 624 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting cas-
es in which prepetition seizures by the IRS were not returned to the bankruptcy
estate).
129. See 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (discussing property that the trustee may use, sell, or
lease under section 363); see also Craig S. Provorny, Note, The Outer Limits of Sec-
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Analogously, where the chapter 7 trustee possesses collateral,
the same secured party could have the automatic stay lifted
because no equity exists. 3 '
The definitive interpretation of section 542(a)'s reach is the
fantastic case of United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc."' This
case is fantastic because it rests bankruptcy jurisdiction on the
giddy footing of hypothetical speculation." 2 To the extent it
empowers a speculative-not a prudential-logic, Whiting Pools
is deeply disturbing to the practice of securitization.
In Whiting Pools, the IRS claimed approximately $92,000 in
back taxes. 3 ' Pursuant to its tax lien, the IRS seized invento-
ry, equipment, vehicles, and office supplies with a liquidation
value of "at most, $35,000."134
Having filed for bankruptcy, the debtor-in-possession sought a
turnover of the collateral under section 542(a) and section
543.5 After some fallow maneuvering over which section prop-
erly governed the action, the bankruptcy court ordered a turn-
tion 542 of the Bankruptcy Code: United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., Revisited, 7
CARDozo L. REv. 935, 937-40 (1986) (discussing turnover under section 542(a)).
130. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(A).
131. 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
132. According to Hegel, "the relation of the hypothetical judgement is necessity or
inner substantial identity associated with external diversity of Existence, or mutual
indifference of being in the sphere of Appearance." GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH
HEGEL, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 699 (A.V. Miller trans., Humanities Press 1969)
(1812).
133. See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 199.
134. Id. at 200. The going concern value of the inventory, it appeared, was precise-
ly $162,876. See id.; United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. (In re Whiting Pools, Inc.),
10 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 15 B.R. 270 (W.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 674
F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1982), affd, 462 U.S. 198 (1983). Most court valuations are unable
to obtain this level of precision. See generally David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors
and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 63 (1991) (dis-
cussing theories of valuation in bankruptcy). A debtor surplus existed on the basis of
this going concern valuation, and one suspects that the valuation was colored by the
bankruptcy court's desire to assure the existence of bankruptcy jurisdiction. In any
case, this implication of debtor surplus was irrelevant to the analysis. Justice
Blackmun wrote his opinion as if the collateral were valued at the low liquidation
value of $35,000. But see Brown v. Evanston Bank (In re Brown), 126 B.R. 767, 772
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (hinting that Whiting Pools hinged on a large going concern value of
collateral).
135. See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 201.
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over under section 543."6 The court of appeals, however, pre-
ferred that the turnover be baked in the oven of section 542(a).137
On further appeal, Justice Blackmun ruled that the debtor-in-
possession had turnover rights under section 542(a).'38 The
debtor's rights in the inventory were not extinguished just be-
136. See id.
137. See id. at 202. The standards for these two sections seem to be largely
identical.
Section 543 is appropriate when a "custodian" is in possession of the collateral.
A "custodian" is a receiver, trustee, or agent under state law who is authorized to
enforce a lien. The exact definition appears in the Bankruptcy Code § 101(11), which
states that a "custodian" means:
(A) receiver or trustee of any of the property of the debtor, appoint-
ed in a case or proceeding not under this title;
(B) assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of the
debtor's creditors; or
(C) trustee, receiver, or agent under applicable law, or under a con-
tract, that is appointed or authorized to take charge of property of the
debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien against such property, or for
the purpose of general administration of such property for the benefit of
the debtor's creditors.
11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1994). A custodian with knowledge of the bankruptcy must stop
all disbursements, see id. § 543(a), and must hand over the collateral to the bank-
ruptcy trustee. See id. § 543(b)(1). But a court may also excuse compliance with a
turnover action "if the interests of creditors and, if the debtor is not insolvent, of
equity security holders would be better served by permitting a custodian to continue
in possession, custody, or control of such property." Id. § 543(d)(1).
About the only substantive difference between section 542(a) and section 543 is
that, if the custodian is an: assignee for the benefit of creditors under a state law
whose jurisdiction is over 120 days old by the time of the petition, no turnover can
be ordered. See id. § 543(d)(2).
Although it would appear to make no substantive difference, courts have ruled
that a secured party who repossessed under Article 9 is not a "custodian" because
the secured party is no longer working on behalf of another. See Flournoy v. City
Fin. of Columbus, Inc., 679 F.2d 821, 824 (11th Cir. 1982) (following the pre-Code
rule); Whiting Pools, 674 F.2d at 148-49, affd, 462 U.S. 198 (1983); Debmar Corp. v.
United States (In re Debmar Corp.), 21 B.R. 858, 859 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
Therefore, the secured creditor could not be deemed a "trustee, receiver, or agent
under applicable law, or under a contract, that [was] appointed or authorized to take
charge of property of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien." 11 U.S.C. §
101(11)(C). This holding overlooked the fact that the secured party was a trustee or
agent of the debtor or junior secured parties, in case there was a surplus. See Luize
E. Zubrow, Rethinking Article 9 Remedies: Economic and Fiduciary Perspectives, 42
UCLA L. REV. 445, 448 (1994). Therefore, it was possible to call a repossessing se-
cured party a custodian, but, as it seems to make little difference, the courts were
guilty of harmless error at best in their steadfast denial of the proposition.
138. See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 211.
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cause the IRS seized it."3 9 The final alienation of debtor and
thing would occur only when the inventory was sold in a foreclo-
sure sale. 40
What were the debtor's connections to the repossessed inven-
tory that justified bankruptcy jurisdiction? Justice Blackmun
mentioned two things. First, the debtor had a hypothetical right
to a surplus, in case a buyer at a foreclosure sale might bid more
than the amount of the secured claim.' Justice Blackmun as-
139. See id. at 211-12.
140. See id. at 211 ("Until such a sale takes place, the property remains the
debtor's and thus is subject to the turnover requirement of § 542(a)."). Justice
Blackmun also noted that the Internal Revenue Code itself refers to the debtor as
the "owner" of the collateral prior to the foreclosure sale. See id.
A turnover of this sort would not mean that ordinary secured creditors must
forfeit their collateral. Once collateral is returned, an ordinary secured creditor
would still have a lien on it, for which a bankruptcy trustee must supply adequate
protection. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e); Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 211-12. Failure to pro-
vide adequate protection permits the secured party to have the automatic stay dis-
solved "for cause." See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The issue, then, was not ownership of
the thing, but control and use over time.
Tax lien creditors, however, are worse off than other secured creditors, because
their liens are deeply subordinated to the administrative expenses of the bankruptcy
proceeding. According to section 724(b), "[plroperty in which the estate has an inter-
est and that is subject to a lien that . . . secures an allowed claim for a tax" must
be distributed to any creditor with a priority under section 507(a)-most notoriously
the lawyers for the debtor-in-possession. See id. § 724(b). If it had prevailed in prov-
ing the debtor had "no interest" in the repossessed inventory, then the IRS could
have escaped this subordination. But because the inventory fell within section
542(a)'s reach, it might have been subjected to subordination under section 724(b)
and so had to subsidize the expensive maneuvers and scholarly ruminations of the
debtor's bankruptcy lawyers.
Based on the Whiting Pools decision, however, it appears the bankruptcy court
sculpted highly preferential treatment for the IRS. See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at
201 n.6; United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. (In re Whiting Pools, Inc.), 10 B.R.
755, 761 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.), rev'd 15 B.R. 270 (W.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 674 F.2d 144
(2d Cir. 1982), affd, 462 U.S. 198 (1983). This treatment overlooks the deeply subor-
dinated position the IRS should have had in the chapter 11 proceeding. Nor is there
any justification for payments to the IRS in advance of plan confirmation. Such right
to payment is restricted to special situations identified in the statute. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 331 (lawyers), 365(d)(3) (commercial landlords), 1114 (medical insurance for work-
ers). See generally Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Ne-
cessity and Its Parameters, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 11-17 (1989) (arguing that interim
payments are always justified by nonstatutory emergencies). But see Craig B. Coo-
per, Note, The Priority of Postpetition Retainers, Carve-Outs, and Interim Compensa-
tion Under the Bankruptcy Code, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 2337 (1994).
141. See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 211.
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serted this debtor interest even though its "value" was nonexis-
tent and very speculative." Second, the debtor had a right to
be notified of the impending sale.13 Although the value of this
notice is likely to be nil, its mere existence was enough to
ground bankruptcy jurisdiction over the inventory.'
B. Its Relativism
Whiting Pools, then, grounds bankruptcy jurisdiction on value-
less, or mere hypothetical, property interests. 45 If a bankrupt-
cy trustee can fathom any legal connection between the debtor
and a thing, the thing may be expropriated for the benefit of the
unsecured creditors-though, to be sure, in exchange for ade-
quate protection.
14
Nevertheless, a counternote is also sounded by Justice
Blackmun, who noticed the very same textual defect emphasized
here. Worrying that section 541(a) admits only the debtor's inter-
est in collateral-for example, it excludes the security interest
and so puts secured parties beyond the scope of bankruptcy ju-
risdiction-Blackmun wished to show that, where a debtor
owned even a valueless equity, the bankruptcy trustee could use
the entire piece of collateral, not just the debtor equity: "Section
541(a)(1) speaks in terms of the debtor's 'interests... in proper-
ty,' rather than property in which the debtor has an interest, but
this choice of language was not meant to limit the expansive
scope of the section."147 Here, Justice Blackmun noted that sec-
tion 541(a)(1) seems to include debtor equity but not the security
interest itself.1 48 Taken in isolation, such a principle would ex-
142. See id. at 207 n.16, 210-11.
143. See id. at 201 n.4.
144. See id.
145. See In re Alcom Am. Corp., 154 B.R. 97, 103 (Bankr. D.D.C.) ("Any interest
the debtor has in property, no matter how insignificant, constitutes property of the
estate ... ."), vacated in part, 156 B.R. 873 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1993), afftd, 48 F.3d 539
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
146. See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 204 ("Both the congressional goal of encouraging
reorganizations and Congress' choice of methods to protect secured creditors suggest
that Congress intended a broad range of property to be included in the estate.").
147. Id. at 204 n.8 (citations omitted).
148. See id.
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clude secured creditors from bankruptcy jurisdiction altogeth-
er.'49 But Justice Blackmun rejected this utter failure of the
Bankruptcy Code to expand jurisdiction on the basis of legisla-
tive history:
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
exclude from the estate property of others in which the debtor
had some minor interest such as a lien or bare legal title. Simi-
lar statements to the effect that § 541(a)(1) does not expand
the rights of the debtor in the hands of the estate were made in
the context of describing the principle that the estate succeeds
to no more or greater causes of action against third parties
than those held by the debtor. These statements do not limit
the ability of a trustee to regain possession of property in
which the debtor had equitable as well as legal title.5°
Carefully read, this footnote indicates that section 541(a)(1) is
very expansive, insofar as the debtor's equitable property inter-
ests are concerned, but restrictive, insofar as the debtor's legal
interests are concerned. A debtor's lien is therefore in the estate,
but the account debtor's equity is outside of it. Such an exclusion
prevents a secured creditor from filing for bankruptcy and then
using the account debtor's equity interest in property to rehabili-
tate the secured creditor. Nor does a debtor's "legal" title over
fiduciary property suggest that the beneficiaries of wills or pen-
sion funds must contribute to the rehabilitation of their bank-
rupt fiduciary. Being monstrous, the proposal will simply not be
entertained; therefore, a debtor's "minor interests" are to be ex-
cluded from the estate.
Once again, these statements, based on legislative history,
cannot be justified by the text of the Bankruptcy Code. Section
541(a)(1) includes both legal and equitable property interests on
the same basis. 5' Section 541(d) excludes the equitable inter-
ests of others, 52 but section 541(a)(1) equally expels the legal
149. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994) (stating that the "estate is comprised of all
the following property, wherever located: . . . all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case").
150. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 204 n.8 (citations omitted).
151. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
152. See id. § 541(d).
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interests of nondebtors. 15' Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code
quite says that a trustee can use the collateral but not the bene-
ficial side of a trust relationship. On the contrary, section 363(a)
suggests that the trustee may use any cash in which a debtor
and some third party share a property interest.15
Finally, it may be noted that Justice Blackmun's distinction
between legal title and equitable title can be made to cohere
with Judge Gerling's suggestion that bankruptcy jurisdiction
turns on ownership of appreciation value. "5' When the debtor
is the equitable owner, the debtor enjoys all appreciation value,
and the bankruptcy courts may take jurisdiction over the whole
of the encumbered thing in the hope of nurturing the apprecia-
tion value for the benefit of the unsecured creditors. 5 ' When
the debtor is the legal owner, growth in value belongs to a third
party, not to the debtor.'57 The legal interest is therefore "mi-
nor" and cannot be used to justify seizure of the whole thing for
the benefit of the unsecured creditors.'5 8
Thus, Justice Blackmun may have correctly identified the
spirit of the Bankruptcy Code, but the words of the Bankruptcy
Code do not yield forth any such prodigy.
IV. THE PREMISES OF SECURITIZATION
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the holding of
Whiting Pools supports the foundation of bankruptcy jurisdiction
on extremely tenuous debtor property interests in property joint-
ly owned by others. Whiting Pools's dictum, however, honors the
legislative history that purports to subject secured creditors to
bankruptcy jurisdiction while excusing other property claimants.
How does this legal background affect securitization's sacred
premises?
153. See id. § 541(a)(1).
154. See id. § 363(a).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 109-12.
156. See id.; Carlson, supra note 120, at 258-63.
157. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
158. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204 n.8 (1983).
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A. The Traditional Test
Currently, the defenders of securitization assume that bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction turns on whether a debtor sells property or
whether it merely grants a security interest on it.'59 The dis-
tinction between sales and liens is no doubt important for other
reasons. Most significantly, a sale of a general intangible may
have no perfection requirement because such sales are not sub-
ject to Article 9's governance.' 0 A lien on the same property,
though, falls under Article 9's jurisdiction. 6' Whether a gener-
al intangible had been sold or merely encumbered with a lien
determines whether a transferee of the intangible must perfect
her interest under Article 9 to survive bankruptcy avoid-
ance.'62 The inquiry into the sale-lien distinction will be rele-
vant when general intangibles have been transferred. The dis-
tinction is also important to determine whether a secured party
must account for any surplus to the originator" or whether
the usury laws apply."
In drawing this distinction, courts have grown suspicious of
any self-serving declaration in the contract itself." Instead,
courts penetrate the form to discover the essence of the deal. 66
Very roughly speaking, the characterization of the transfer as a
lien or as a sale turns on who bears the risk of market fluctua-
159. See Pantaleo et al., supra note 31, at 161 ("Defining true sale is the holy grail
of the securitization market .... ."). At least one case has denied bankruptcy juris-
diction on the basis of this test. See Harris v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re
Bargstedt), 7 B.R. 556, 557 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980).
160. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (1995); Debora L. Threedy, Loan Participations-Sales or
Loans? Or Is That the Question?, 68 ORE. L. REv. 649, 654 (1989).
161. See U.C.C. § 9-102(2).
162. See Threedy, supra note 160, at 653-54.
163. See U.C.C. § 9-502(2); Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602
F.2d 538, 542-44 (3d Cir. 1979).
164. See Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 31, at 182.
165. See, e.g., Major's Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 543 (finding a lien, despite con-
trary contract language, so that the debtor owned a surplus); First Natal Bank v.
Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp. II (In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp. II), 19 B.R.
609, 614 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982), reo'd on other grounds, 32 B.R. 737 (W.D. Ky.
1983), affd, 763 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1985). Courts are nevertheless willing to give
contractual language some weight in close cases. See, e.g., TKO Equip. Co. v. C & G
Coal Co., 863 F.2d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that a lessor who drew up a
"lease" could not claim that the transfer was a sale).
166. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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tion.67 Who suffers when prices fall and who benefits when
prices rise will be relevant, but not sufficient, to determine the
characterization. Unfortunately, transferees have insisted on all
sorts of devices that blur the line. For instance, a lien might be
nonrecourse, thereby posing all risk of decline on the transferee.
Or a sale might be subjected to recourse, so that the seller has
an unsecured obligation to repurchase defective collateral."
The former does not necessarily destroy lien status, and the lat-
ter does not necessarily destroy sale status.'69 The tests are
much more complicated than that.'
It is an error to assume, however, that the sale-lien distinc-
tion is also the test for bankruptcy jurisdiction. Instead, the only
proper test is: whether state law connects or disconnects the
debtor to or from the thing transferred. If alienation is less than
167. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Grover (In re Woodson Co.), 813 F.2d 266,
271-72 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that the buyers' absolute right to payment and the
seller's purchase of insurance proved the transfer was a lien); Castle Rock Indus.
Bank v. S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc., (In re S.O.A.W. Enters.), 32 B.R. 279, 282-83 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1983) (holding that guaranties proved the transfer was a lien, not a sale).
168. See Pantaleo et al., supra note 31, at 160.
169. See Bear v. Coben (In re Golden Plan of Cal., Inc.), 829 F.2d 705, 710 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that a buyer's option to obtain payment from seller in lieu of waiting
for collection did not preclude a sale); Major's Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 544-46
(finding a lien, not a sale, existed). In Major's Furniture Mart, Judge Leonard Garth
thought that a hold-back of a portion of the sale price created a security interest in
the sale of accounts. See id. at 546. But this does not necessarily follow. The premise
that recourse is not fatal to the characterization of sale is that the seller's warranty is
a separate transaction from the sale of the account. If the purchase price is held back,
then the buyer reserves a right of setoff to secure the warranty claim. In short, the
separate recourse is a secured claim of the buyer, but it is still separate from the sale
of the account. See Pantaleo et al., supra note 31, at 161.
Grant Gilmore took a different position, suggesting that any kind of recourse
proved that the transfer was a lien. 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PER-
SONAL PROPERTY § 44.4, at 1230 (1965). This reasoning would turn any Article 2
transaction into a lien, when the seller offers any warranties, implied or express.
170. See generally Pantaleo et al., supra note 31, 163-79 (discussing the complex
case law regarding when a sale of financial assets with recourse is a true sale).
Some arguments that have proved persuasive are that a fixed return unconnected
with the interest rate in the sold account suggests a lien, not a sale. See Ables v.
Major Funding Corp. (In re Major Funding Corp.), 82 B.R. 443, 448-49 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1987). Reduction of an antecedent debt upon the assignment proves that an
account was sold, i.e., an "asset payment," not a lien. See Dewhirst v. Citibank
(Ariz.) (In re Contractors Equip. Supply Co.), 861 F.2d 241, 245 (9th Cir. 1988)
(finding a lien because antecedent debt was not reduced).
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complete, then the debtor's share of the thing is in the bankrupt-
cy estate. 7' This, at least, is what the plain words of the
Bankruptcy Code require. 72
The next few sections set forth the reasons why it might be
said that a debtor's connection to an account or chattel paper
does not end, even if it is "sold." First, Article 9 reserves in sell-
ers of accounts and chattel paper the power to convey better title
to some subsequent transferee.7 ' Because this is so, the broad
statement from Octagon Gas Systems that so disturbs the securi-
tization industry was formulated correctly. 74 Second, to the ex-
tent that securitization permits the originator to remain the col-
lecting agent, the originator has a property interest directly in
the thing sold, even though this property interest is held in trust
for the buyers of the accounts. Because section 363(a) and sec-
tion 363(c)(2) permit the use of cash in which the debtor is a
cotenant, this power to collect is an adequate basis on which to
found bankruptcy jurisdiction.75
B. Power to Convey Senior Rights
It can be shown that Article 9 does not terminate the connec-
tion of the debtor to a sold account or chattel paper, even if the
buyer perfects the sale by filing a financing statement. To see
171. See First Nat'l Bank v. Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp. II (In re Hurricane
Elkhorn Coal Corp. II), 19 B.R. 609, 614 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) ("Whether the as-
signment of accounts is characterized as an absolute and irrevocable assignment,
much in the nature of a sale, or as a security device, the ultimate question is whether
the estate has any interest in the proceeds from the assigned accounts."), rev'd on
other grounds, 32 B.R. 737 (W.D. Ky. 1983), affd, 763 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1985).
172. According to Professor David Frisch:
The Code defines a security interest as "an interest in personal property
or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." Al-
though this language is strongly suggestive of a property interest, it
must be understood that definitions do not create property interests.
Whatever terminology is employed, the key point is that a true property
interest cannot be defined independently of the remedies that are avail-
able to the secured party.
David Frisch, The Implicit 'Takings" Jurisprudence of Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 11, 18 (1995) (quoting U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1995)).
173. See infra text accompanying notes 176-200.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 314-81.
175. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(a), (c)(2) (1994).
19981 1083
1084 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1055
why this is so, we start with a proposition that no one really
doubts: if the buyer does not perfect, then the sold account is
part of the bankruptcy estate.'76
First, we could do with a definition of "property," something
the Bankruptcy Code does not supply.'77  Instead,
nonbankruptcy law must supply the definition. Let us, for the
purpose of our demonstration, define property the Hohfeldian
way-as an agglutination of rights, powers, privileges, and
immunities.' 8
If a buyer of accounts or chattel paper never takes a perfect-
ing step,'79 then the debtor has a "power" to convey it free and
clear of the buyer's rights.80 This proposition is established in
section 9-301(1)(c) for chattel paper 8' and section 9-301(1)(d)
for accounts. s2 According to section 9-301:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2)," an unper-
176. See id. § 547(c)(5) (excluding perfected interests from the bankruptcy estate);
U.C.C. § 9-301(1).
177. See Harris v. Petri (In re Petri) 59 B.R. 58, 70 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1986).
178. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Ap-
plied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913). Hohfeld has recently come
under attack for doing away with the concept of property, reducing the legal uni-
verse to one without "things" at all--only disembodied human subjects interacting
with each other at a level of utterly useless abstraction. See Jeanne L. Schroeder,
Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93
MICH. L. REv. 239, 290-95 (1994). This critique undoubtedly has merit. I wish here
only to expropriate Hohfeld's distinction between rights and powers, or no-rights and
disabilities-useful vocabulary for what follows.
179. A buyer of accounts must file a financing statement, unless the sale "does not
alone or in conjunction with other assignments to the same assignee transfer a sig-
nificant part of the outstanding accounts of the assignor." U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(e). A large
originator of sold accounts may be tempted to argue that a single securitization deal
does not constitute a significant part of the originator's total portfolio of accounts. See
Dan T. Coenen, Priorities in Accounts: The Crazy Quilt of Current Law and a Proposal
for Reform, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1061, 1085-103 (1992). At this point of the analysis, we
are assuming that a financing statement would be required.
As to chattel paper, a secured party may perfect either by filing or by possessing
the relevant documents that constitute the chattel paper. See U.C.C. §§ 9-304(1), -305.
180. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c) to (d).
181. See id. § 9-301(1)(c).
182. See id. § 9-301(1)(d).
183. Subsection (2) governs purchase money security interests. It provides a means
for purchase money secured parties to take back priority after a debtor conveys title
to a subsequent lien creditor or a buyer out of the ordinary course of business or to
a buyer of farm products. See id. § 9-301(2).
ROTTEN FOUNDATIONS OF SECURITIZATION
fected security interest is subordinate to the rights of
(a) persons entitled to priority under Section 9-312;'"
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security
interest is perfected;
c) in the case of... chattel paper, a person who is not a
secured party and who is a transferee in bulk or other buyer
not in ordinary course of business or is a buyer of farm prod-
ucts in ordinary course of business, to the extent that he
gives value and receives delivery of the collateral without
knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected;
(d) in the case of accounts... a person who is not a se-
cured party and who is a transferee to the extent that he
gives value without knowledge of the security interest and
before it is perfected."
Under this provision, if the buyer forgets to perfect, then the
seller retains a power to convey these accounts and chattel pa-
per free and clear to a second secured creditor who is the first to
perfect, 8 ' or to a second buyer without knowledge. 7 This
power means that the debtor owns a property interest in the
sold accounts, so long as the buyer does not perfect."
184. These persons are subsequent secured parties who are the first to perfect their
own security interest or who are the first to file a financing statement. See id. § 9-
312(5)(a).
185. Id. § 9-301(1). This provision is not without its ambiguities. First, although
the provision applies only to "security interests," the UCC's definition of "security in-
terest" is careful to include the rights of buyers of accounts and chattel paper. See
id. § 1-201(37). Hence, a buyer "who is not a secured party" is an impossibility. Sec-
ond, the provision merely "subordinates" the rights of buyers. Properly understood,
the power to "subordinate" is coterminous with the power to convey free and clear of
the right altogether. See generally David Gray Carlson, Death and Subordination
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Senior Buyers and Senior Lien
Creditors, 5 CARDozo L. REV. 547, 547-63 (1984) (discussing section 9-301, the pow-
ers of a seller to transfer property and its effect on security interests); David Gray
Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment of Liens on After-Acquired Property, 6 CAiozo L.
REv. 505, 512-13 & n.38 (1985) (discussing connection of priorities to the termination
of liens).
186. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1)(a), -312(5)(a).
187. See id. § 9-301(1)(d).
188. Even this truth has been disputed by Professor Dan Coenen, who gives this
following example: Suppose D "sells" accounts to A, who does not perfect. D then
sells the same accounts to B, who is the first to perfect. Professor Coenen suggests
that A might win because, when D "sold" to A, D successfully alienated the ac-
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The UCC also creates power in creditors. The power is con-
tained in section 9-301(1)(b), which provides that "an unperfect-
ed security interest is subordinate to the rights of... (b) a per-
son who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is
perfected."'89 This power, implicit in any unsecured creditor,
or, for that matter, in any human being or other legally recog-
nized entity who may become a creditor, permits a creditor to at-
tach a judicial lien to the property a debtor has already con-
veyed to her secured party.9 ' In this respect, Article 9 express-
es a fraudulent conveyance idea. We may say that an unsecured
creditor of D has no in rem rights in D's assets--only an in per-
sonam right that implies access to a judicial lien, if the right
counts in a very complete and thorough way. After the sale to A, D had no rights
in the collateral, and therefore B's second-in-time interest cannot attach. See
Coenen, supra note 179, at 1076-80; see also Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood
Aviation Corp. (In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp.), 850 F.2d 1275, 1278-79 (8th Cir.
1988) (making this error with regard to an airplane sale not perfected in Federal
Aviation Administration records).
This is a metaphorical error. The logic Professor Coenen follows is that a sale
is a complete alienation of seller from thing, from which it follows that buyers
from or judicial lien creditors of a debtor cannot possibly obtain property free and
clear of A's unperfected security interest. See Coenen, supra note 179, at 1077-78.
But it is precisely the point of Article 9 to overcome this assumption. It is by
virtue of Article 9 that sales of accounts are not the complete alienation of debtor
from thing.
Professor Coenen suggests that courts should reject this faulty conclusion, but
only on consequentialist grounds. That is, if we admit that D has no rights in the
thing, then Article 9's perfection regime simply fails to punish A for not perfecting.
This consequence would appear to contradict the intent of the drafters and there-
fore it is to be rejected.
Professor Coenen's consequentialist point is valid, but unnecessary. See Coenen,
supra note 179, at 1078-80. Property in a thing is some right, privilege, power, or
immunity, according to our Hohfeldian definition. If D has a power to alienate the
thing free and clear of A, then D owns a part of the thing. That is to say, D and A
are coowners. Or, if D's creditors have the power to sell A's thing in order to satisfy
D's debt, A and D's creditors are coowners.
The debtor's power to convey free and clear is, by itself, "rights in the collater-
al." U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c). When D conveys the same accounts to B as collateral for a
loan, B's security interest therefore attaches to the accounts by virtue of this power.
Hence, the purely consequentialist reason of Professor Coenen, though well taken, is
not the basis on which to argue that B is capable of taking priority over A.
189. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).
190. See id.
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procedures are followed.' Suppose, however, that D makes a
fraudulent conveyance to A-a secret lien, for instance. The
creditors of D now have a power over A's property. According to
this power, the creditors of D may affix judicial liens to A's prop-
erty and sell it in satisfaction of D's debt. 92
This is the very power on which a bankruptcy trustee's avoid-
ance theories depend. As a matter of federal law, the trustee
becomes a lien creditor.' 9 Hence, when D conveys an unper-
fected security interest to A, D's bankruptcy trustee expropriates
this power from the creditors. Only the trustee may reach A's
property, which comes into the bankruptcy estate under section
541(a)(3). 4 Other creditors are stayed from pursuing this
"property of the estate."' 95 The securitization industry concurs
with this, and so, lawyers are careful to assure that a proper
financing statement is filed, even when accounts or chattel pa-
per are "sold."'96
By now, two points have been established that will be impor-
tant in the discussion that follows. First, a debtor retains a pow-
191. See id. § 9-301(1)(b), (3).
192. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
193. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1994).
194. See, e.g., Concrete Equip. Co. v. Fox (In re Vigil Bros. Constr., Inc), 193 B.R.
513 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (determining that sold accounts entered the bankruptcy
estate because the buyer forgot to perfect). The bankruptcy estate includes "[ainy
interest in property that the trustee recovers under section . . . 550." 11 U.S.C. §
541(a)(3). The trustee may recover property under the strong-arm power of section
544. Section 541(a)(3), therefore, plays Chance to the Tinkers and Evers of section
550(a) and section 544(a).
195. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2).
196. According to section 9-103(3)(b) of the UCC, the law of the debtor's location
applies. See U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(b). If the debtor is located abroad in a jurisdiction
that provides for recordation of a security interest, then the-foreign law applies. See
id. § 9-103(3)(c). If the jurisdiction has no recording system, then the law of the
state in which the debtor has its most major executive office governs. See id. If the
debtor has more than one place of business, then "location" means the place of the
chief executive office. See id § 9-103(3)(d). Once the choice of law is established,
section 9-401(1) establishes the proper place of filing. See id. § 9-401(1). The drafters
of the UCC have offered states three alternative versions of § 9-401. Most notorious-
ly, the third alternative suggests that if the debtor has a place of business in only
one county of a state, then the secured party must file both locally and with the
secretary of state. See id. § 9-401(1)(c) (third alternative subsection (1)). These rules
make perfection treacherous but well within the bounds of certainty needed for a
law firm to issue an opinion letter.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1055
er to convey accounts and chattel paper, even after they are
sold.'97 This retained power is an ownership right in the thing
transferred. Second, at least when the buyer of an account or of
chattel paper does not perfect, the creditors of the debtor have the
power to obtain a judicial lien on the property of the secured par-
ty.9' This latter power is the foundation of the trustee's strong-
arm power. 1
99
The next three sections will show that, after a buyer of accounts
or chattel paper files a financing statement under Article 9, the
debtor continues to own interests in the sold accounts.2"' On the
basis of these interests, bankruptcy courts may retain jurisdiction
over the proceeds of sold accounts, even over the opposition of
account buyers.
V. RETAINED INTERESTS IN SOLD AccouNTs AND CHATTEL PAPER
A. Power to Convey Chattel Paper in the Ordinary Course
The first point covers only chattel paper. Even though the point
is of limited reach, it introduces some basic concepts that will be
useful for later discussion and so is a convenient place to start.
Perfection does not end a debtor's power to alienate when the
SPV purchases chattel paper, unless the SPV takes possession of
it.2 ' According to section 9-308(a):
A purchaser of chattel paper or an instrument who gives new
value and takes possession of it in the ordinary course of his
business has priority over a security interest in the chattel
paper or instrument
(a) which is perfected under Section 9-304 (permissive filing
and temporary perfection) or under Section 9-306 (perfection
as to proceeds) if he acts without knowledge that the specific
paper or instrument is subject to a security interest.202
197. See supra notes 176-88 and accompanying text; see also § 9-301(1)(a) (granting
power to debtors).
198. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text; see also § 9-301(1)(b) (creating
powers in creditors).
199. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 201-71 and accompanying text.
201. See U.C.C. § 9-308(a).
202. Id.
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If SPVs perfect only by filing and if they appoint the originator
as collecting agent, the originator will typically retain a connec-
tion with the thing sold. This connection is enough to establish
bankruptcy jurisdiction over securitization, to the extent that
the deal involves secured receivables." 3
The capture of sold chattel paper by the bankruptcy estate,
because the debtor retains a power to sell, must overcome the
following objection: According to Bankruptcy Code section
541(b)(1), property of the estate does not include "any power
that the debtor may exercise solely for the benefit of an entity
other than the debtor."0 4 It is clear that a debtor has a power
to convey chattel paper free and clear of a buyer's interest, when
the buyer has failed to take possession of the chattel paper,20 5
but it is equally clear that the debtor ought not to use this pow-
er. If the debtor does so, then what is received in return is
deemed to be proceeds owned by the secured party.25 In short,
D owns the power to convey in trust for A. If D uses the power
for her own benefit, D is in breach of a fiduciary duty to A;
therefore, D's power to convey accounts free and clear of A's
ownership rights is not part of the bankruptcy estate. 7
203. Thomas Plank disputes this interpretation:
One can counter this argument by stating [D] still has "rights" in
the collateral because she has the contingent power to defeat [Al's inter-
est by assigning the account to [B]. The power is contingent because it
depends upon [B] filing before [Wl files. It is a perversion of language to
call this power, which is an illegitimate power, a "right."
Plank, supra note 18, at 489-90 (footnote omitted). Professor Plank also wishes to dis-
tinguish an "illegitimate power" from a Hohfedlian "legal power." See id. at 490. This
misconceives Hohfeld's definition. According to Hohfeld, a "power" is the "ability" to
change the present rights of other people. See I-ohfeld, supra note 178, at 45. It is a
"right" over the rights of others and therefore quite consistent with the UCC's phrase
"rights in the collateral." Although it is true that D is obligated to use her power for
the benefit of A, this does not change the fact that D is nevertheless an owner of the
thing, just as any trustee has legal title to the corpus of a trust.
204. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (1994); see Sigmon v. Royal Cake Co. (In re Cybermech,
Inc.), 13 F.3d 818, 820 (4th Cir. 1994) (interpreting section 541(b)(1) as saying that
"property of the debtor does not include assets being held by the debtor in trust for
another").
205. See supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
206. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
207. See id.
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That section 541(b)(1) expels all powers from the bankruptcy
estate cannot, by itself, explain why a debtor's power to sell
chattel paper free and clear of the buyer's perfected interest is
not within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy trustee. Section
541(b)(1) cannot be taken literally. Rather, courts must expel
some powers and retain others, contrary to the plain meaning of
the statute."'
The reason why section 541(b)(1) must be applied selectively
pertains to a debtor's power to sell inventory free and clear of
security interests.0 9 Such a power is not distinguishable from
the power to sell chattel paper free and clear. Yet if the power to
sell inventory is expelled by section 541(b)(1) from the bankrupt-
cy estate, then it becomes impossible to explain why a debtor-in-
possession may run a retail business under the aegis of chapter
11. The inventory could never be sold because the power to sell
free and clear is not part of the bankruptcy estate.
As to this last point, it may be objected that section 363(f)(3)
permits the sale of inventory, regardless of what section
541(b)(1) says.210 In other words, section 541(b)(1) may expel
debtor powers to sell free and clear,"' but section 363(f)(3)
reestablishes the power in the bankruptcy trustee as a matter of
federal law." 2 Section 363(f)(3) provides:
The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of
this section free and clear of any interest in such property of
an entity other than the estate, only if-
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such prop-
erty is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all
liens on such property.21
208. See, e.g., Amdura Nat'l Distrib. Co. v. Amdura Corp. (In re Amdura Corp.), 75
F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir. 1996) (determining a manager of funds had the power to
abuse his fiduciary position making the funds part of bankruptcy estate).
209. See U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
210. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3) (1994).
211. See id. § 541(b)(1).
212. See id. § 363(f)(3).
213. Id.
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Unfortunately for securitization, the invocation of section
363(f)(3) to save the power to sell inventory likewise saves the
power to sell free and clear of a buyer's right in chattel pa-
per.214 The two powers are not analytically distinguishable.
Few readers will have failed to note a certain tension in the
thesis of this argument. First, I have relied upon the literal
words of section 541(a)(1) to bring SPV chattel paper into the
bankruptcy estate.215 Second, I have ignored the literal words
of section 541(b)(1) because such a reading would contradict the
existence of the strong-arm power.1 6 I have also ignored the
literal meaning of the Bankruptcy Code by suggesting that, once
illiquid collateral is brought within the estate, the trustee can
actually use it under section 363(b)(1) or section 363(c)(1)-a
premise not borne out by the actual words of those provisions.
Hence, I both emphasize and dismiss the literal meaning of the
Bankruptcy Code." 7
The reader has me dead to rights here. But this simply proves
my point. The Bankruptcy Code is contradictory and requires
the good will of judges to make it coherent. Because of this ten-
sion, securitization depends entirely upon the good will and leg-
islative proclivities of individual bankruptcy judges. The real
point of this Article is to emphasize how securitization depends
entirely on the subjective will of human beings, not on the con-
tent of the Bankruptcy Code, which inadequately theorizes the
nature of the bankruptcy estate. Yet securitization little de-
serves any such good will.
B. The Right to Collect Accounts After Sale
There is a second reason why, in a great many cases, securiti-
zation might fail to remove assets from the hypothetical jurisdic-
tion of a bankruptcy proceeding. Most securitization is on a non-
notification basis. 18 That is, the account debtors are never in-
214. See id.
215. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
218. See U.C.C. §§ 9-318(3) cmt. 3, -308 cmt. 1. (1995).
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structed to pay some third party assignee.219 Instead, the origi-
nator serves as collecting agent."' The account debtors contin-
ue to pay the originator as if the originator were still the owner
of the claim against them.22' Such payments extinguish their
obligations, thanks to section 9-318(3), which provides: "The
account debtor is authorized to pay the assignor until the ac-
count debtor receives notification that the amount due or to
become due has been assigned and that payment is to be made
to the assignee."222 Section 9-318(3) creates a classic power to
"use" accounts or chattel paper by collecting them and thereby
extinguishing them.2  According to this power, the debtor may
still collect accounts until the account debtor receives notice
otherwise. This power would appear to be a property right of the
debtor-under the Hohfeldian definition that identifies "power"
as a connection with the thing.
219. See id. § 9-308 cmt. 1.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. Id. § 9-318(3).
223. Some courts have found the power to collect influential in determining that a
hypothecation, not a sale, of accounts has occurred. See, e.g., Southern Rock, Inc. v.
B & B Auto Supply, 711 F.2d 683, 685 (5th Cir. 1983) (imposing obligation to per-
fect on a secured lender claiming general intangibles); Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra
note 31, at 191-92. The argument presented here holds the sale-lien distinction irrel-
evant to determining bankruptcy jurisdiction. The argument is that the power to
collect itself is always a debtor right in the thing itself.
224. See In re Modem Settings, Inc., 74 B.R. 358, 360-61 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987).
In Pepper/Holt Joint Venture v. Roderick Group, Inc. (In re Hodeveo, Inc.), 165 B.R.
855 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994), Judge George Paine said as much, though perhaps in
mere dicta. In Hodevco, the debtor had only one asset-a promissory note. See id. at
857. The debtor pledged the note to a creditor in exchange for a loan but kept pos-
session of the note itself. See id. The creditor therefore held an unperfected security
interest in this asset. A judgment creditor of the debtor attempted to garnish the
asset by serving notice of garnishment on the account debtor. See id. The real issue
in the case was whether a judgment creditor can effectively garnish a claim against
the account debtor that is embodied in a promissory note. Judge Paine held that the
judgment creditor had to seize the note itself. See id. at 859.
In describing the debtor's property in the promissory note, Judge Paine wrote:
A holder of a note has the right to transfer or negotiate the note
and the right to enforce payments on the note against its maker. The
debtor thus retained the legal right to enforce payment of the note
against ... its maker. This right is a legal interest recognized by Ten-
nessee law. Assuming the debtor retained this legal interest as holder
upon filing bankruptcy, this interest became property of the estate under
ROTTEN FOUNDATIONS OF SECURITIZATION
When the debtor in a securitization deal files for bankruptcy,
all the accounts to be collected by the debtor for the benefit of
the buyer of the account are therefore property of the estate. To
be sure, only the debtor's legal title enters the estate under sec-
tion 541(a)." Section 541(d) reiterates the point by providing:
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement
of the case, only legal title and not an equitable interest,...
becomes property of the estate ... only to the extent of the
debtor's legal title to such property, but not to the extent of
any equitable interest in such property that the debtor does
not hold.'
Nevertheless, section 363(a) defines cash collateral as the whole
thing in which "the estate and an entity other than the estate
have an interest."227 Once collected, the debtor holds cash col-
lateral of the buyer of the accounts. Cash collateral can be used
with court permission.2" According to section 363(a):
"[Clash collateral" means cash, negotiable instruments, docu-
ments of title, securities, deposits accounts, or other cash
equivalents whenever acquired in which the estate and an
entity other than the estate have an interest and includes the
proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits of property...
subject to a security interest as provided in section 552(b) of
this title, whether existing before or after the commencement
of a case under this title.'
§ 541(a)(1).
Nothing occurred prior to the debtor's bankruptcy to divest the debt-
or of his legal interest as holder of the note . . . . The debtor retained
possession of the note and did not endorse it over to [the secured party].
[The] security interest in the note, therefore, did not divest the debtor of
its legal interest as holder and payee of the note.
Id. at 858 (citation omitted). This remark is most inconsistent with the premises of
securitization, in that the powers of the debtor as holder are said to decide the case.
Of course, because the case involved the debtor's grant of an unperfected security
interest, it followed that the security interest was voidable in the debtor's bankrupt-
cy. But this is not the reasoning followed in the above passage.
225. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994).
226. Id. § 541(d).
227. Id. § 363(a).
228. See id. § 363(c)(1).
229. Id. § 363(a).
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Notice that this definition of cash collateral merely includes pro-
ceeds of a security interest. It does not therefore exclude pro-
ceeds of an account that a buyer owns outright.
Now section 363(a) requires the bankrupt estate and some
other entity to have an interest in the same cashY What kind
of interest does the ultimate borrower, as collection agent, share
with the buyer of the account?
It probably must be admitted that the collection agent is the
trustee of an express or perhaps a constructive trust. Under ei-
ther theory, the debtor, as collecting agent, has a legal interest,
and the remote subsidiary buyer has the beneficial interest. It is
widely assumed that these funds-the res of a trust-are not
part of the bankrupt estate under section 541(a)." 1 The usual
basis for this claim is section 541(d). 2 But that provision does
not actually exclude the funds entirely from the bankrupt estate.
Rather, it only excludes the beneficial interest."3 As a result,
"the estate and an entity other than the estate have an inter-
est"234 in the cash, and therefore it can be used under section
363(c). Because it can be used, the trustee can have a turnover
under section 542(a). As always, the trustee will have to provide
adequate protection to the buyer of the accounts, but, on the
theory just presented, the buyer has not rendered itself bank-
ruptcy remote, and this particular premise of securitization is
therefore defeated.
The foregoing remarks concerned cash in the hands of the col-
lecting agent at the time of bankruptcy. What of the outstanding
accounts not yet paid? When the debtor files for bankruptcy, does
the debtor continue to have the power to collect these accounts?
The premise of the above discussion is that the debtor had
power to collect accounts, and that this "power"--emanating
from section 9-318(3)-is a property interest in the accounts
230. See id.
231. See In re Braniff Int'l Airlines, Inc., 164 B.R. 820, 825 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994).
232. See, e.g., id.
233. See id.; 11 U.S.C. § 541(d).
234. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a).
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themselvesY 5 This is a conclusion the Supreme Court has
reached in United States v. National Bank. 6 In that case, the
IRS levied a joint bank account shared by a taxpayer and two
nontaxpayers. 7 The IRS had a lien on all the taxpayer's prop-
erty and proceeded to levy the joint account." The bank re-
fused to pay on the ground that others owned the account in
conjunction with the taxpayer. 9 The bank could not discern
what ownership right the taxpayer had in the joint account and
so it refused to pay anything." ° Justice Blackmun, of Whiting
Pools fame, ruled that the bank had to pay because the
taxpayer's right to withdraw funds, i.e., collect an account,
"qualifies as a right to property for purposes of [the tax lien
statute]."" To be sure, the nontaxpayers could retrieve their
property from the government later. 2 In the meantime, the
bank had to pay the government, and the government could
control the proceeds of nontaxpayers.' As the power to with-
draw funds from a bank account or another is precisely identical
to the power to collect the account of another, "property of the
debtor" has been established in the bare collection right.'
If this is correct, then any interference with this power is a
violation of bankruptcy's automatic stay. 5 Furthermore, in
chapter 11, a trustee may use this power "in the ordinary course
235. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
236. 472 U.S. 713, 722-26 (1985).
237. See id. at 716.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 725. As Justice Lewis Powell complained in dissent, Justice Blackmui's
reasoning applies even if the taxpayer had a zero beneficial interest in the bank
account. See id. at 735 (Powell, J., dissenting). According to one commentator, "in the view
of the majority, that right to withdraw, without any ensuing legal possessory interest, is a
sufficient 'string on the property or 'sticl from the bundle of rights to authorize attachment
of the tax lien." Steve R. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc: Tenancy-by-the-
Entireties Interests and the Federal Tax Lien, 60 MO. L. REV. 839, 874 (1995).
242. See National Bank, 472 U.S. at 731.
243. See id. at 730-33 (holding that the IRS had the power to levy the joint account).
244. The National Bank analysis is used to determine what is property of the
bankruptcy estate for purposes of section 541(a)(1). See In re Guardian Realty
Group, L.L.C., 205 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1997).
245. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1994) (barring "any act to ... exercise control over
property of the estate").
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of business" without court authorization. 6 This power therefore
suggests that, whenever securitization forgoes notification of the
account debtor, the debtor retains a power to collect. This power
to collect is clearly a property right in the account itself. 7 The
right to collect was an incident of ownership prior to the sale of
the account, and after the sale, the right to collect is retained by
the debtor; only the remainder was transferred."
Another consideration is that the originator is a collector by
virtue of an executory contract. If the bankruptcy trustee as-
sumes this contract, then all past defaults must be cured
"promptly."24 Such a requirement suggests that the originator
must turn over collected proceeds precisely when the contract
requires that they be turned over. Such an observation cannot
help securitization, however. The contract can also be reject-
edY °0 If so, the moneys withheld and the forward-looking power
to collect are still property of the estate that, ex hypothesi, a
trustee can "use." Furthermore, pending assumption or rejection,
the automatic stay prevents any attempt to obtain these property
rightsY Hence, the status of the collection right as an execu-
tory contract provides no solace.
C. The Contingent Nature of Article 9 Perfection
A third property interest in sold accounts or chattel paper can
be identified. Unlike the first two, which rely on debtor powers
over the accounts or chattel paper, this one relies on the
trustee's own status as a judicial lien creditor under federal law
and under Article 9. 2 According to Article 9, perfection of a
sale of accounts or chattel paper is only provisional."3 Because
this is so, the trustee always retains a future interest in the sold
accounts. 54 A future interest is enough for a court to take ju-
246. Id. § 363(c)(1).
247. See In re Modern Settings., Inc., 74 B.R. 358, 360-61 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987).
248. See id.
249. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1).
250. See id. § 365(a).
251. See id. § 362(a)(3).
252. See U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1995).
253. See generally id. § 9-403(2) (describing how the effectiveness of a filed financ-
ing statement lapses after five years).
254. See generally id. § 9-301(3)-(4) (describing the trustee in bankruptcy as a "lien
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risdiction over the present interest. 5
When a SPV buys accounts and chattel paper, it carefully files a
proper financing statement, so that its "security interest"-as the
UCC calls itf 6-- is perfected. 7 Securitization presumes that
this terminates the power of the debtor or her creditors to convey
superior title to third parties. 5 With the demise of this power,
the debtor is supposed to lose all in rem contact with the thing,
and the sold account has forever escaped from bankruptcy juris-
diction. In Hohfeldian terms, the debtor or her creditors supposed-
ly are "disabled" from transferring the account free and clear.
This premise, however, can be effectively attacked. When the
security interest is perfected, the debtor's connection with the
thing does not end. Rather, perfection under the UCC is merely
provisional. 59 The debtor's power to convey free and clear of
the account buyer's interest never disappears but simply goes to
sleep and dreams of playing at nine-pins-for a period of five
years.26 According to section 9-403(2), "The effectiveness of a
filed financing statement lapses on the expiration of the five
year period unless a continuation statement is filed prior to the
lapse."26' After a secured party perfects an assignment of ac-
counts, the debtor might still have the power to convey free and
clear if the secured party forgets to file a continuation statement
near the end of the five-year period.262 This future power is im-
plicit in the nature of the thing, and it proves that Article 9 cov-
erage of accounts and chattel paper sales guarantees that bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction always exists.
Chattel paper may be perfected by possession.263 But this
does not change the analysis. Perfection lasts only so long as
creditor" who has a contingent interest in secured property).
255. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994) (defining the power of the court); id. §
362 (detailing the automatic stay that goes into effect from the date of filing a peti-
tion for bankruptcy).
256. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
257. See id. § 9-302(1), -304(1).
258. See Coenen, supra note 179, at 1076-80.
259. See U.C.C. § 9-403(2).
260. See id.
261. Id.
262. See id. § 9-403(3).
263. See id. § 9-305.
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possession is perpetuated.2"' Being provisional, the debtor re-
tains a future power to convey free and clear of the buyer should
perfection ever lapse.
The trustee's judicial lien attaches to the future contingent
interest in these accounts, and so a trustee might presently sell
a future interest to some buyer. 5 Such a buyer could only suc-
ceed to the rights of the trustee as lien creditor. The SPV with a
financing statement on record would continue to have senior
rights. But eventually the bankruptcy proceeding might end, and
the SPV might fail to file a continuation statement. Under these
circumstances, the second buyer, who succeeds to the trustee's
rights, would gain a promotion. The second buyer would then be
entitled to collect the accounts or the chattel paper obligation.
Undoubtedly, such a scenario is fantastic. What sensible buy-
er would pay good cash for such a right? Such a question, how-
ever, misses the point of the exercise. The premise of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, as interpreted by Whiting Pools, is that any debtor
property interest, or property interest of the bankruptcy trustee,
no matter how hypothetical, is enough to ground bankruptcy
jurisdiction.266 The existence of an extremely contingent future
interest may be valueless in the market place, but it still consti-
tutes a property right in the sold account or sold chattel paper.
Interestingly, Professor Thomas Plank chastises Article 9 for
requiring buyers to file continuation statements:
For a sale, however, filing is necessary to perfect the valid
transfer of the account, to establish the record of the chain of
title so to speak. If A sells to B and then B sells to C, none of
the parties intend that the interest transferred be extin-
guished or that it become subordinate to subsequent credi-
tors. The filing should remain in effect as long as the account
exists. Section 9-403 does not recognize this difference. In-
stead, for C to maintain the perfection of its ownership inter-
est in the account, the validity of the public record of its
chain of title, C must do two things. First, she must file a
264. See id.
265. See, e.g., id. § 2-403 cmt. 1 (describing the basic policy of law as allowing
transfer of such title as the transferor has).
266. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 207-09 (1983); supra
notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
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continuation statement for the transfer to her. Second, she
must get B to file a continuation statement to continue the
perfection of the transfer from A. B has sold the account and
normally has no interest in doing so. For C to file a continua-
tion statement for the transfer from A to B, C must file a sep-
arate written assignment of the first financing statement....
Consequently, for C to have and maintain her ownership in-
terest in the account, she must file not only her financing
statement, commonly called a UCC-1, she must also file an
assignment of the financing statement in favor of B, called a
UCC-3. This double filing requirement is not necessary and
should be eliminated.2"
Professor Plank also acknowledges that the contingent nature of
perfection constitutes an "inadvertent" interest in a sold ac-
count 25-- as if the inadvertence of the Article 9 drafters defeats
the foundations of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. Thus, Plank
goes on to suggest that founding bankruptcy jurisdiction on such
a property interest is "absurd."269 Absurd it may be, but remem-
ber the fantastic grounds of Whiting Pools, in which bankruptcy
jurisdiction was founded on the mere hypothetical chance of a
surplus or the requirement that the IRS send notice to the tax-
payer of any levy.27 So long as the debtor has an in rem relation
to the thing, no matter how tenuous or valueless, the bankruptcy
trustee may insist that the property be turned over.27'
So long as the formalist holding of Whiting Pools applies, Ar-
ticle 9 fails to provide for total alienation when a debtor sells
accounts or chattel paper, even when the buyer promptly perfects.
267. Plank, supra note 18, at 487-88.
268. See id. at 460.
269. See id. at 460-61 n.280. Plank reported that Article 9 inadvertently gives sell-
ers of accounts and chattel paper some rights in the collateral sold. See id. Buyers,
i.e., secured parties, must therefore take reasonable care of chattel paper in their
possession. See U.C.C. § 9-207(1). Buyers must verify the amount of the secured
claim upon the debtor's request. See id. § 9-208. The buyer must file a termination
statement at the seller's request. See id. § 9-404(1). All of these duties are nonsensi-
cal; they are simply the result of defining secured parties to include buyers of ac-
counts and chattel paper. See Plank, supra note 18, at 488-94.
270. See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 201 n.4, 210-11.
271, See id. at 211.
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D. The Bankruptcy Code's Policy
Thus far, we have seen that the Bankruptcy Code itself per-
mits the trustee to use any liquid property in which the debtor
has any property interest, no matter how remote. It does not
seem to permit the use of any illiquid property. This is the re-
sult if we read the Bankruptcy Code word for word, "with the
ease of a computer."272
This reading contradicts the practice of bankruptcy law over
the past two decades. It is therefore apparent that the practice
of law assumes that the Bankruptcy Code does not alone supply
the governance of the bankruptcy estate. Instead, bankruptcy
courts must make policy. They must legislate as a supplement
to, and sometimes even in derogation of, the actual words of the
Bankruptcy Code. But what should this policy be?
One thing should be apparent: just because Wall Street has
invested its countless billions in securitization does not prove
that this investment should be supported by the Bankruptcy
Code. The securitization industry moved into this business in
the face of an inadequate legal regime and may not now insist
that judges legislate in their favor simply because the financial
consequences to themselves are supposedly great.
Presumably not everything that is, is right.27 A large insti-
tution that has grown up around tax avoidance elicits little sym-
pathy when its legitimacy is called into question. Rather, some
universal principle more noble than tax avoidance should be
identified to uphold or condemn the practice. If universal princi-
ples exist, then securitization may continue its lucrative busi-
ness. If not, then let the massy wheel of securitization fall, and
let each petty consequence and small annexment attend the
boisterous ruin.
There are powerful reasons for bankruptcy courts to take ju-
risdiction over sold accounts and chattel paper when the oppor-
tunity arises. Let us assume for the sake of argument that the
question before us is one of taxation.274 Under the inherent
272. Bank of Matin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966).
273. But see Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF
ENGLISH LITERATuRE 1720, 1727 (M.H. Abrams ed., W.W. Nortandt Co. 1968) (1733).
274. See supra pp. 1064-65 (discussing the Bankruptcy Tax on secured creditors).
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principle of the legislative history, but not the statute, secured
creditors should pay the Bankruptcy Tax, and beneficiaries of
trust property should not."' The issue is whether securitiza-
tion is more like secured credit or more like beneficial interests
in fiduciary property. In short, the question can only be an-
swered by quantifying similarity and difference into the comfort-
able intuition of "more or less."
The securitization industry, eminently aware of the above dis-
tinction, specifically designed its product to fall on the
nontaxation side of the line.27 This was done with the full con-
sent of debtors, who enjoyed lower interest rates because they
were "financed" by the securitization industry's expectation of
tax avoidance.
The first thing to note is that Congress is hostile to contractual
devices designed solely to avoid bankruptcy jurisdiction and the
Bankruptcy Tax it implies.277 The Bankruptcy Code prohibits
any condition subsequent on property that is tied to a debtor's
insolvency.27 Antialienation clauses are struck down because
such clauses deprive the bankruptcy trustee of the opportunity to
sell a debtor's asset for a profit. 9 And finally, Congress has de-
cided that debtors may not waive their bankruptcy rights.8
Securitization attempts to contract around the trustee's right
to a bankruptcy turnover, when such rights are supposed to be
unwaivable by a prepetition debtor. Why should clients of the
securitization industry have a special privilege to waive their
bankruptcy rights when ordinary debtors must bear the over-
weening paternalism of bankruptcy law? Securitization may de-
mand freedom of contract for its clients, but this demand must
be made to Congress, not to individual bankruptcy courts who
are not supposed to legislate in competition with Congress. If
275. See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 204 n.8.
276. See generally William R. Giusti, Asset Securitization, in ASSET-BASED FINANC-
ING INCLUDING SECURITIZATION AND ACQUISITION FINANCING 1994, at 335, 350-55
(PLI Commercial L. and Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4447, 1994) (dis-
cussing the use of tax exempt trusts for SPV's).
277. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1129(d) (1994) (providing that a court may refuse a
proposed chapter 11 plan if the principle purpose of the plan is avoidance of taxes).
278. See id. § 541(c)(1).
279. See id. § 365(e)(1).
280. See id. § 522(e).
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Congress deems Fortune 500 companies incompetent to waive
their bankruptcy rights, then bankruptcy courts are obliged to
follow this legislative choice.
The intent of the parties to place securitization on the tax
avoidance side of the line cannot carry weight unless securitiza-
tion essentially belongs there. Yet, the UCC itself, by legislating
in the area of sales of accounts and chattel paper, indicated that
sales belong on the secured credit side of the line."l Comment
2 to UCC Section 9-102, as it was drafted initially, strongly indi-
cates that Article 9 is unconcerned with whether a sale or a lien
was created, when it comes to accounts or chattel paper. 2 Ac-
cording to this comment:
An assignment of accounts or chattel paper as security for an
obligation is covered by subsection (1)(a). Commercial financ-
ing on the basis of accounts and chattel paper is often so con-
ducted that the distinction between a security transfer and a
sale is blurred, and a sale of such property is therefore cov-
ered by subsection (1)(b) whether intended for security or
not.... The buyer then is treated as a secured party, and his
interest as a security interest.'
The UCC's comments indicate that regardless of whether a sale
or a security interest was intended, the transfer should be
treated alike.'
To be sure, the UCC was drafted when the Bankruptcy Tax on
secured credit in bankruptcy was much less severe than it is
now.' In the 1950s, when the above language was written,
undersecured creditors were entitled to postpetition interest."5
281. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (1995). Article 9 of the UCC is, in fact, titled "Se-
cured Transactions; Sales of Accounts and Chattel Paper."
282. See id. § 9-102 cmt. 2.
283. Id.
284. See id.
285. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing the limited bankruptcy
jurisdiction over the interest of secured creditors under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
286. Aphorisms to the contrary abound, because of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's
remarks in Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 344 (1911). In practice, however, any
secured party could cause collateral to be expelled from bankruptcy jurisdiction
whenever the secured party was not obtaining interest compensation. See Carlson,
supra note 73, at 593-95. The Bankruptcy Code, however, apparently reversed this
1102
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Because the Bankruptcy Tax was light or nonexistent, the UCC
was insouciant. Congress, however, has now increased the Bank-
ruptcy Tax.' It would be unseemly for Article 9 to change its
meaning just so that debtors and secured parties can avoid tax-
es. The Bankruptcy Tax has been imposed on secured creditors,
and therefore on debtors, on behalf of the unsecured creditors
and on behalf of debtors who would like to rehabilitate them-
selves. Article 9 should not change its meaning, depending on
the economic self-interest of only some of the parties concerned
with the impact of Article 9.
In light of the Octagon Gas opinion,' the original intent of
the drafters to erase the line between sales and secured transac-
tions has now been renounced by the Permanent Editorial Board
in an unsatisfactory "commentary." 9 According to this com-
mentary, the Octagon Gas court is guilty of rendering accounts
inalienable.29 Thus:
It is a fundamental principle of law that an owner of property
may transfer ownership to another person. Were a statute
intended to take away that right, it would do so explicitly
and such a significant curtailment of rights would be sup-
ported by substantial reason. No such reason is expressed or
implied in the Code or the Official Comments.29'
assumption, or so the Supreme Court assumed in United Saving Ass'n v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Ass'ns, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 370-80 (1988). For a fuller account of this
story, see Carlson, supra note 73, at 601-10.
287. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
288. Octagon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve, Inc.), 995 F.2d 948
(10th Cir. 1993).
289. See P.E.B. COmiENTARY, supra note 35.
290. See id.
291. Id. On the basis of this commentary, the Permanent Editorial Board added
the following new language to comment 2 to section 9-102:
Neither Section 9-102 nor any other provision of Article 9 is intended to
prevent the transfer of ownership of accounts or chattel paper. The deter-
mination of whether a particular transfer of accounts or chattel paper
constitutes a sale or a transfer for security purposes (such as in connec-
tion with a loan) is not governed by Article 9. Article 9 applies both to
sales of accounts or chattel paper and loans secured by accounts or chat-
tel paper primarily to incorporate Article 9's perfection rules.
U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 2 (1995).
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This comment is unsatisfactory because it substitutes clumsy
word play and Cartesian anxiety for real analysis. The above
commentary assumes that either the buyer or the seller "owns"
the property.292 It assumes that the two cannot simultaneously
be the owner.
Property ownership cannot be conceived as an all-or-nothing
proposition. Twentieth-century lawyers would never say that
either a person owns the whole of a thing or otherwise nothing
at all. Rather, property is a continuum. 93 A person may trans-
fer some of her rights to a thing without severing all relations to
the thing.2" This, I think, is what is meant when lawyers refer
to property as a "bundle of sticks."295 A "transfer" of property
implicates the voluntary or involuntary passage of some of these
sticks from the transferor to the transferee.296 Whether all or
merely some of the sticks are transferred can only be answered
by reference to the law of sales, which, in our case, is supplied
by Article 9.
One of the sticks in the fasces is the transferor's right to make
transfers. 7 Another is the right to "use" the account or chattel
paper by collecting the account.29 The very program of Article
9 is to prevent transferors from transferring all the sticks in the
292. See P.E.B. COMMENTARY, supra note 35.
293. See Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984) ("Property' is more
than just the physical thing-the land, the bricks, the mortar-it is also the sum of
all the rights and powers incident to ownership of the physical thing. It is the tan-
gible and the intangible. Property is composed of constituent elements .... ") (quot-
ing Passailaigue v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 682, 686 (M.D. Ga. 1963)).
294. See generally U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (describing how a purchaser of a limited inter-
est acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased).
295. Benjamin Cardozo was one of the first lawyers to use this metaphor. See BEN-
JAMIN N. CARDOzO, THE PARADOX OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1927) ("The bundle of
power and privileges to which we give the name of ownership is not constant
through the ages. The faggots must be put together and rebound from time to
time.").
296. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
297. See id. § 9-311.
298. See generally id. § 9-106 (defining an "account" as any right to payment for
goods sold or for services rendered that is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel
paper). Frequently, a security interest will be created by the creditor in all debtor's
accounts, existing and after acquired. The debtor may maintain a steady cash flow
by collecting on the accounts, and the secured party continues to be secured by the
after acquired accounts.
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bundle. 9 A debtor under Article 9 cannot give up her powers
to make transfers, regardless of her intent. Rather, Article 9
makes certain ownership rights inalienable.0 It does so with
the specific intention of providing an incentive for the transferee
to take the perfecting steps.3 'O Without reserving in the debtor
the right to convey superior title to purchasers of lien creditors,
the entire Article 9 perfection regime would collapse." 2 It is
simply false that "[i]t is a fundamental principle of law that an
owner of property may transfer ownership to another per-
son."03 The "fundamental principle" is quite the opposite.
Whenever the law subjects property to a perfection scheme or
when legal and equitable title are divided, the law disables
alienation of all the property."' Indeed, it is rare that a trans-
feror is unilaterally capable of conveying all the sticks in the
bundle in one act of manifested intent. 5 In the United States,
no real or personal property can be conveyed in this way. Almost
always some act of recordation or delivery of the transferred
thing is required to "perfect" the transaction. 6 Virtually any
property subject to "equity" jurisprudence empowers the legal
owner to convey good title free and clear of the rights of the
cestui que trust, but only to bona fide purchasers. Even Article 2
empowers sellers to resell sold items, in many cases. 7 Hence,
the power to alienate absolutely is precisely what Article 9-and
commercial law generally-prevents.
The above quoted "commentary" accuses Judge Baldock, in
Octagon Gas, of suggesting that the "sale" of an account is an
299. See generally id. § 9-403(2) (describing how a filed financing statement auto-
matically lapses after a five-year period, unperfecting the interest of the secured par-
ty, recreating by implication ownership rights in the debtor or the debtor's transferee).
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. P.E.B. COMMENTARY, supra note 35.
304. See U.C.C. § 9-403(2).
305. See id. But cf. id& § 9-305 (describing how a secured party may perfect his
interest in chattel paper by taking possession of it).
306. See § 9-403(2). But cf id. § 9-305 (perfecting a security interest with possession).
307. See § 2-403(1)(2) (voidable title and entrustment).
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impossibility."'5 "Sale" in this sense is supposed to mean the
absolute and final transfer of the very last stick in the bundle.
Of course it is Article 9 that interferes with this notion, not
Judge Baldock. The most that can be said of Article 9, as it was
promulgated thirty years ago, is that the debtor's power to
alienate cannot itself be permanently alienated. Before the
transferor perfects, the debtor has substantial power to alienate
and to "use" the account."0 9 After the transferor perfects, the
debtor's power of alienation is reduced. By no means does this
power disappear. It is one of our "inalienable rights."
The drafters of Article 9 decided to tax secured creditors-and
debtors-by imposing the costly step of perfection upon
them.31 0 Recently, Congress has further taxed secured creditors
by forcing them to contribute to debtor rehabilitation.3 "' The
current Permanent Editorial Board opposes the Bankruptcy Tax.
But it is for Congress, not the Permanent Editorial Board, to
decide who shall pay the Bankruptcy Tax and who shall not. For
this reason, the Permanent Editorial Board's officious advice to
the bankruptcy courts regarding their own jurisdiction should be
politely but firmly declined.
To summarize, Congress has decided that secured creditors
should contribute collateral to debtors in order to help rehabili-
tate them. Securitization wishes to avoid the Bankruptcy Tax by
characterizing the transfer of general intangible property as a
"sale" rather than as a "security interest." The policy of the UCC
in a tax-free era was that the distinction between sales and se-
curity interests in accounts and chattel paper was
insubstantial.31 This policy should still hold true now that
Congress has raised taxes. Although many today view the Bank-
ruptcy Tax to be socially undesirable, it is the tax imposed by
Congress. 313 It is up to Congress-not to private parties, judg-
308. See P.E.B. COMMENTARY, supra note 35.
309. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (describing the protection afforded a buyer in the
ordinary course of business from a security interest created by his seller).
310. See id. §§ 9-302, -304(1), -305, -306(3).
311. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (describing the Bankruptcy Tax
on secured creditors).
312. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) cmt. 2.
313. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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es, or even the admittedly august Permanent Editorial Board of
the UCC-to change this federal tax structure.
VI. OCTAGON GAS
The proposition that upsets the securitization industry is that
a debtor who sells an account retains some sort of property in-
terest in it, which justifies bankruptcy jurisdiction over the ac-
count. Judge Bobby Baldock, in Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v.
Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve, Inc.), 14 made such a
statement 15 and, accordingly, sent off national shock waves
that registered in the higher octaves of the Richter scale. We
have seen that his dictum is quite justifiable, however. Because
debtors have a contingent power to convey the assigned accounts
a second time free and clear of the first buyer's rights, once the
buyer's financing statement has lapsed, the debtor always has a
connection to the thing in question.31 This and like connec-
tions mean that the account is not fully alienated yet. Bankrupt-
cy jurisdiction still exists. The debtor's property right is, of
course, valueless and ephemeral, but quite enough to sustain the
prodigal weight of bankruptcy jurisdiction. This is the lesson of
Whiting Pools, in its fantastic mode, rather than the prudential
mode of the footnoted dicta.
Octagon Gas matters only for its controversial dictum, but, for
the record, it can also be shown that the case was decided right-
ly on its facts. In Octagon Gas, Judge Baldock remanded to the
bankruptcy court to determine whether a sale of the debtor's
assets in a chapter 11 plan was free and clear of a cotenancy in
"proceeds" of natural gas claimed by a buyer of that cotenan-
cy.317 This holding was perfectly correct.
In Octagon Gas, the debtor ran a gas-gathering business.31
Essentially, the debtor bought gas from wells at wholesale and
resold at retail.319 In 1976, a shareholder of the debtor bought
314. 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993).
315. See id. at 956.
316. See U.C.C. §§ 9-403(2), -312(5).
317. See Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 958.
318. See id.
319. As Judge Baldock put it, the debtor's system "included all gas purchase and
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all other outstanding shares." In exchange, the buying share-
holder granted to the selling shareholders an "overriding royalty
interest" in the gross proceeds received by the shareholder from
gas sold by the debtor.3 2' Now this was a peculiar transac-
tion. 2 The shareholder of the debtor had no direct interest in
the proceeds of the gas sold."r Therefore, Judge Baldock ob-
served that the phrase "royalty" was a misnomer."a The share-
holder was entitled to whatever dividends the board of directors
might vote in its discretion."a The shareholder, apparently,
was selling a participation in dividends received by the share-
holder from the debtor.2 If so, the selling shareholders were
not receiving an interest in the surviving shareholder's shares,
but in the cash such shares generated. 7 It is common for
lenders to take a pledge of stock, thereby entitling them to any
dividends that the shares might engender."a But it is uncom-
sales contracts pursuant to which the System buys and sell gas and all accounts
receivable from the sale of gas or gas liquids by the System." Id. at 952 n.1; see
also id. at 959 (Seth, J., dissenting) (describing the transaction in similar terms).
320. See id. at 959 (Seth, J., dissenting)
321. See id. at 952.
322. Cf. Crockett v. McKenzie, 867 P.2d 463, 467 (Okla. 1994) ("An 'overriding
royalty' generally arises through contracts between the lessee and a third person. It
is a fractional interest in the gross production of oil and gas under a lease in addi-
tion to the royalty reserved to the land owner or lessor.").
323. See Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 953.
324. See id. at 953 n.3.
325. See id. at 953-54.
326. Judge Baldock also found this agreement peculiar.
The language of the 1976 Agreement is ambiguous. For example, the
Agreement specifies that the interests created in favor of the selling
shareholders are interests in the proceeds received by [the shareholder]
through the [debtor's] System. However, [the shareholder] itself received,
under the 1976 Agreement, one of these interests in the amount of ten
percent. In other words, to give this phrase its literal effect, we would
have to conclude that [the shareholder] made an agreement to pay itself.
Id. at 953 n.4.
327. See In re Mintz, 192 B.R. 313, 317 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (holding that a
right to distribution from arguable Article 8 securities is not an interest in the secu-
rities themselves, but rather a general intangible).
328. Oddly, Judge Wade Brorby, Judge Baldock's colleague on the Tenth Circuit,
implied that, if pledgees of stock obtain the right to dividends, they must do so in a
transaction separate from the one creating an interest in the underlying stock. See
FDIC v. Hastie (In re Hastie), 2 F.3d 1042, 1047 (10th Cir. 1993). Judge Brorby
ruled that cash dividends are not "proceeds" of pledged stock because dividends do
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mon for buyers to buy the right to dividends separate from the
shares themselves.
So characterized, this sale was not an Article 9 transaction.
The buyer purchased a cotenancy in a general intangible,29 not
in accounts or chattel paper. Article 9 applies to the sale of ac-
counts and chattel paper, but it does not apply to the sale of
general intangibles.33 In addition, to the extent the buyers
bought a general intangible from a shareholder, the buyers had
no status in the debtor's bankruptcy.3 ' They certainly bought
no "accounts" from the debtor.
332
These defects were mitigated when the debtor corporation lat-
er assumed the shareholder's contractual obligation and made
itself liable to pay a share of the proceeds directly to the selling
shareholders.33 This assumption of liability arguably referred
to the promise to pay any discretionary dividends to the selling
shareholders, not an obligation to pay proceeds from the sale of
natural gas.3u The successor to the selling shareholders,
Rimmer, was able to convince the court, however, that the par-
ties intended to create a "royalty interest" in gas proceeds, not a
royalty interest in corporate dividends that the debtor might
choose to vote to its shareholders. 3 5
not come from "disposition" of the shares, within the meaning of section 9-306(1).
See id. at 1045-46. Instead, cash dividends must be general intangibles, not neces-
sarily transferred along with the stock unless a pledge agreement says so. See id. at
1046. In any case, it is still true that those lenders who wish to be secured with
cash dividends usually take the underlying stock as well.
329. See U.C.C. § 9-106 (1995).
330. See id. § 9-102(1).
331. See Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 954-56.
332. Judge Oliver Seth, in dissent, was much more willing to find that the
agreement of the buying shareholder bound the debtor to give over a percentage of
the debtor's proceeds from the sale of gas to the selling shareholders. See id. at 959
(Seth, J., dissenting).
333. Actually, the corporate debtor never agreed to assume liability. Only the
shareholders did. Nevertheless, Judge Baldock ruled that the agreement between the
shareholders was intended to bind the debtor-not a party to the contract. See id. at
953. A and B cannot usually agree that C should be liable, but, under Oklahoma
law, "[c]ontracts involving all of a corporation's shareholders are binding on the cor-
poration." Id. In addition, the debtor ratified the contract later through its perfor-
mance of its terms. See id.
334. See id. at 953.
335. See id.
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The corporate debtor also sold a separate "overriding royalty
interest""3 6 in proceeds of gas directly to a buyer, who resold to
Rimmer."' Rimmer therefore held rights through a sharehold-
er, obligations later assumed by the debtor, and rights directly
from the debtor."' 5 Together, Rimmer was entitled to five per-
cent of all cash proceeds from natural gas and liquids sold by
the debtor."9
These rights coming directly from the debtor are also replete
with ambiguity. Was Rimmer buying the gas directly, or merely
proceeds from the gas? According to Judge Baldock, the buyer
had no right to the gas at all: "As a threshold matter, we agree
with the bankruptcy court that the use of the term 'overriding
royalty interest' in the underlying transaction is technically in-
correct for lack of an oil and gas leasehold estate. Nevertheless,
the transactions created an enforceable interest in the [debtor]
System's gas sale proceeds." 4 ' A sale of an interest in proceeds
of gas, with no right to the gas itself,"' is not necessarily a
sale of accounts. Accounts are "any right to payment for goods
sold or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by
an instrument or chattel paper, whether or not it has been
earned by performance. " "2 Proceeds of natural gas might in-
clude all sorts of property, including cash, checks, and accounts
receivable. 43 Nevertheless, it appears that the debtor arranged
to sell natural gas through long term executory contracts with
utilities.3 Hence, it is likely that all proceeds of the natural
gas were initially accounts and, later, some sort of cash equiva-
lent, as the utilities paid their obligations under these contracts.
336. Id. at 952.
337. See id.
338. See id.
339. See id.
340. Id. at 953 n.3 (citation omitted).
341. The sale of royalties is routine, however, when the gas is still in the ground.
Here, however, the gas is purely personal property, bought by the debtor after sever-
ance from the earth. See id. at 954.
342. U.C.C. § 9-106 (1995).
343. See generally id. § 9-306(1) (defining "proceeds" as embodying any payment).
344. See generally Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 952 (describing the debtor's reorgani-
zation plan).
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A sale of an executory contract is the sale of an account 345 -an
Article 9 transaction. 6
The sale of proceeds, but not of the underlying goods, may im-
plicate the sale of after-acquired property.47 Does the UCC even
authorize such a transaction? This is very doubtful indeed.4 8 A
sale of proceeds implies that after-acquired property clauses
might be applied to outright purchases of accounts, chattel paper,
and, indeed, any property that might constitute proceeds.349
To be sure, after-acquired property clauses are routine in se-
curity agreements pertaining to accounts receivable-but only
where the accounts are collateral for a loan. Although Article 9
applies to the outright sale of accounts,350 it is not clear that Ar-
ticle 9 sanctions an after-acquired property right in the context of
purchases. According to UCC section 9-204(1): "a security agree-
ment may provide that any or all obligations covered by the secu-
rity agreement are to be secured by after-acquired collateral."35'
This authorization of after-acquired property clauses contem-
plates an obligation secured by collateral." Of course, the col-
lateral in question-accounts-are obligations of the account debt-
ors. But these obligations are not the obligations referenced in
section 9-204(1). These obligations are in fact the collateral. The
obligations referenced in section 9-204(1) can only be the debtor's
obligations to the secured party, not the account debtor's obliga-
tions to the debtor. Yet no such obligation existed in Octagon Gas.
That is to say, Article 9 does not expressly authorize after-ac-
quired property clauses when accounts are sold. Rather, it autho-
rizes after-acquired property clauses only when a lender advances
345. See U.C.C. § 9-106.
346. See id. § 9-102(l)(b).
347. See generally id. §§ 9-204, -306 (discussing after-acquired property and proceeds).
348. See generally id. §§ 9-204, -306 (lacking concrete guidance on whether after-ac-
quired property is involved in the sale of proceeds).
349. See id. § 9-306. Oil and gas law certainly recognizes the sale of pro-
ceeds-these are royalties and are conceived as real estate interests. But here the
natural gas was personalty because it was already extracted, as Judge Baldock rec-
ognized. See Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 954-55.
350. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b).
351. Id. § 9-204(1).
352. See id. § 9-204(3).
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a loan and takes after-acquired accounts as collateral.353
After filing bankruptcy in 1988, the debtor continued to pay
Rimmer a percentage of the proceeds received, even after
bankruptcy. 5 In 1990, the bankruptcy court confirmed a chap-
353. See Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 955. Nor can anything in Article 2 authorize
after-acquired property clauses, even by analogy. First, Article 2 does not apply to
the sale of intangibles. See U.C.C. § 2-105. Second, even by analogy, Article 2 re-
quires "goods" to be identified to the contract before the buyer can claim any in rem
property interest in things that are after-acquired. See id. § 2-501. Accordingly,
"[gloods must be both existing and identified before any interest in them can pass.
Goods which are not both existing and identified are 'future' goods. A purported
present sale of future goods or of any interest therein operates as a contract to sell."
Id. § 2-105(2). When the buyer claims a share of a fungible bulk of choses in action,
it is hard to claim that the "goods" have been identified to the contract when the
seller acquires a particular chose in action in which the buyer claims a percentage
share.
354. See Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 952. These surrenders are replete with ambigu-
ity. If the proceeds surrendered to Rimmer were generated by prepetition executory
contracts that existed at the time Rimmer's predecessors in interest paid for their
"royalty," then Rimmer had a valid cotenancy. Yet the surrendered proceeds would
have been produced by debtor-in-possession expense. Why should Rimmer capture
the benefit debtor-in-possession investments?
A theory of surcharge is most unclear. If Rimmer had a "secured claim" in the
bankruptcy proceeding, then the debtor-in-possession could charge Rimmer for his
share of the costs under section 506(c), which provides: "The trustee may recover
from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to
the holder of such claim." 11. U.S.C. § 506(c) (1994). But Rimmer did not have a se-
cured claim against the bankruptcy estate-only a cotenancy in executory contracts.
Nor can the "equities exception" to either section 552(b)(1) or (2) apply for exactly
the same reason. Section 552(b)(1) and (2) refer to proceeds covered by prepetition
"security agreements" creating "security interests." See id. § 552(b)(1)(2). A "security
interest" is defined as a consensual lien. See id § 101(51).
Nevertheless, under state law, cotenants of property often have the obligation to
contribute to the upkeep of the co-owned property. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
60 § 74 (West 1992) (providing that a cotenant can require a fellow cotenant to pay
for the upkeep of the land in common). Perhaps the trustee could have invoked
state law to require Rimmer to make a contribution to the natural gas bought to
meet the executory contracts. This contribution could then be used to offset the pro-
ceeds the debtor-in-possession owed Rimmer.
An executory contract created after the original tender of the purchase price to
the debtor would be an "after-acquired" executory contract. A cotenancy in such a
contract might have been a fraudulent conveyance, if the debtor was insolvent at the
time of the contract's creation. Or, if the debtor-in-possession entered into new exec-
utory contract after bankruptcy, then the executory contract would certainly not
belong to Rimmer. Rather, the contract would belong to the debtor-in-possession free
and clear of Rimmer's prepetition agreement. Such a result, however, is not com-
manded by section 552(a), which destroys after-acquired property clauses in
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ter 11 liquidation plan, which sold the gas collecting system to a
secured party whose lien encumbered the system. 355 According
to the plan, the sale was "free and clear of liens, claims, inter-
ests, and encumbrances."56 The secured creditor later resold to
Octagon Gas Systems.35 After confirmation, Rimmer's secured
creditor sought a declaration from the bankruptcy court that
Octagon was obliged to pay a percentage of all proceeds to it, as
Rimmer's creditor.38 Rimmer intervened and took over man-
agement of this litigation.359
The bankruptcy court ruled for Rimmer, on the theory that
the cotenancy never entered the bankruptcy estate in the first
place, and so a chapter 11 plan could not possibly have any ef-
fect on Rimmer's cotenancy."' This is the result that securiti-
zation demands. Octagon had argued that the plan was binding
on Rimmer, so that Octagon bought the assets free and clear of
this cotenancy. 6'
Octagon's position had considerable merit. Section 363(h) re-
fers to a bankruptcy trustee power to sell free and clear of coten-
ancies."' According to Section 363(h):
prepetition security agreements. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a). This section destroys after-ac-
quired property clauses in security agreements, insofar as they created liens. See id.
Rimmer, however, was claiming a cotenancy, not a lien. See Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d
at 952. Assuming such an after-acquired property interest is possible, it is not clear
that section 552(a) would avoid it. Fortunately, section 552(a) is a superfluous provi-
sion. Even if it did not exist, postpetition property obtained by a bankruptcy trustee
would not be subject to a prepetition agreement to which the trustee was not a
party. See generally David Gray Carlson, Bulk Sales Under Article 9: Some Easy
Cases Made Difficult, 41 AL. L. REV. 729 (1990) (exposing the complexities of ana-
lyzing priority disputes between buyers and secured parties). That the trustee is a
debtor-in-possession does not change the analysis, as the debtor-in-possession-a fidu-
ciary of the unsecured creditors-does not act in the same capacity as the
prepetition debtor.
On this analysis, Rimer was entitled only to proceeds of executory contracts
that existed prepetition, provided the executory contract was not created after the
purchase of the royalty and at a time when the debtor was insolvent.
355. See Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 952.
356. Id.
357. See id.
358. See id.
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. See id.
362. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (1994) (describing when a trustee may sell
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Notwithstanding subsection (f) of this section, the trustee
may sell both the estate's interest... and the interest of any
co-owner in property in which the debtor had, at the time of
the commencement of the case, an undivided interest as a
tenant in common, joint tenant, or tenant by the entirety,
only if-
(1) partition in kind of such property among the estate and
such co-owners is impracticable;
(2) sale of the estate's undivided interest in such property
would realize significantly less for the estate than sale of
such property free of the interests of such co-owners;
(3) the benefit to the estate of a sale of such property free
of the interests of co-owners outweighs the detriment, if any,
to such co-owners; and
(4) such property is not used in the production, transmis-
sion, or distribution, for sale, of... natural... gas."
This section arguably applied to Rimmer's cotenancy. Although
subsection (4) refers to cotenancies in facilities used to distribute
natural gas,"6 it does not negate the trustee's power of sale in
Octagon Gas." Recall that Rimmer never purchased a coten-
ancy in "the production, transmission, or distribution" of natural
gas-only a cotenancy in the proceeds of gas.66 The trustee's
power of sale was therefore quite sufficient to terminate
Rimmer's cotenancy in existing accounts and other proceeds. It
was certainly good enough to terminate Rimmer's after-acquired
property rights, which should not have encumbered the debtor's
assets as a matter of state law. 6 '
free of tenancy claims).
363. Id.
364. See id. § 363(h)(4).
365. See Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 955.
366. See id. at 953.
367. In addition, the trustee may have had power to sell the cotenancy under
Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f), which provides:
The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section
free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than
the estate, only if-
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free
and clear of such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
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Judge Baldock reversed the bankruptcy court's declaration that
Rimmer's cotenancy was never within the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court.368 Although he might have cited section 363(h) as
proof of the proposition, Judge Baldock decided instead to rely
upon Article 9 to establish the debtor's relation to the thing-the
cotenancy claimed by Rimmer." 9 Judge Baldock wrote that the
sale of "proceeds" was in effect a sale of accounts." ° Hence, Arti-
cle 9 governed the sale. 71 Here, at last, we see the statements
that have upset the proud dream that plays so subtly with
securitization's repose. According to Judge Baldock:
The impact of applying Article 9 to Rimmer's account is that
Article 9's treatment of accounts sold as collateral would
place Rimmer's account within the property of the bankrupt-
cy estate. Further, if it is determined that Rimmer's account
was not properly perfected, then, upon [the debtor's] filing of
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee as a lien creditor would
have a security interest superior to that of Rimmer. 72
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to
be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property;,
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding,
to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.
11 U.S.C. § 363(f). Section 363()(1) would probably not apply to accounts that exist-
ed at the time of the bankruptcy petition. Section 363(f)(3) would not apply because
the cotenancy was not a lien. Section 363(f)(4), however, might have applied, as
Rimmer's confusing property interest was certainly in bona fide dispute. See Octagon
Gas, 995 F.2d at 952-55 (analyzing Rimmer's property interest as related to that of
the debtor).
Another possibility is that the debtor's lender had a senior security interest that
outranked an unperfected cotenancy of Rimmer. The case was remanded to deter-
mine whether Rimmer had perfected. See id. at 957. If so, and if one follows the
unexamined premise that Article 9 establishes a race priority between secured credi-
tors, then the secured party had the right to sell out Rimmer. In such a case, sec-
tion 363(f)(1) would apply to authorize the "free and clear" sale. See 11 U.S.C. §
363(f)(1).
368. See Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 957.
369. See id. at 955-57.
370. See id. at 954.
371. This is only contingently correct. If all proceeds were accounts, then Article 9
did govern, as Baldock predicted. If only some of the proceeds were accounts, then
Article 9 governed only some of the time. In any case, Baldock assumed, perhaps
correctly, that Article 9 applied all of the time. See id.
372. Id. at 955. This statement is imprecise. A security interest is defined as a
"lien created by an agreement." 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). A judicial lien therefore does
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Although the second sentence is taken for granted, the first sen-
tence violates the premises of securitization.
Invoking the UCC's hostility to the formal notion of title,
Baldock noted that:
Article 9 grants rights in the collateral to creditors in the
event a secured party fails to perfect his interest, regardless
of the location of title and regardless of the debtor's or se-
cured party's legal interest in the collateral. This Article 9
scheme applies with equal force to the sale of accounts. Ar-
ticle 9 treats the interest acquired by a buyer of accounts as
a security interest and treats the buyer as a secured party.
Accordingly, the seller or assignor of the account "does not
part with all transferable rights in... [accounts] even follow-
ing an absolute assignment."373
That is, Article 9 implies a property right in debtors, even after the
sale of an account, because, if the sale is unperfected, lien creditors
and the like might have priority over the unperfected buyer.
In Octagon Gas, Judge Baldock remanded to the bankruptcy
court in order to determine whether the plan could affect
Rimmer's cotenancy interest.374 Finding the record silent as to
whether Rimmer had filed a financing statement, he asked for
a ruling on that question.375 It is tempting to conclude, there-
not qualify as a security interest.
373. Id. at 956 (citing Coenen, supra note 179, at 1079), (other citations omitted);
see also id. at 957 ("[W]e hold that because, under Article 9, a sale of accounts is
treated as if it creates a security interest in the accounts, accounts sold by a debtor
prior to filing for bankruptcy remain property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate.").
The citation to Professor Coenen's article invokes his refutation of the argument
that a buyer of an account need never perfect by filing a financing statement be-
cause the debtor has zero interest in the collateral after such an assignment takes
place. More specifically, Coenen rejects this suggestion: "The Code's description of the
absolute transfer of accounts as a 'security interest' further suggests that the assign-
or does not part with all transferable rights in accounts even following an absolute
assignment." Coenen, supra note 179, at 1079.
374. See Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 958.
375. See id. at 957-58. It is not clear that Rimmer's failure to perfect the cotenancy
should be relevant. According to a majority of courts, avoidance requires an adver-
sary proceeding and may not be accomplished directly in a confirmed plan. See gen-
erally David Gray Carlson, Proofs of Claim in Bankruptcy: Their Relevance to Se-
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fore, that Baldock addressed unperfected purchases of ac-
counts1 76 but this cannot be maintained. Baldock clearly as-
sumed that his holding-that the bankrupt estate retained
property in accounts after they are sold-applies whether or
not the buyer filed a financing statement:
Of course, this is not to say that an account buyer with a
perfected security interest in an account forfeits his interest
upon the debtor's filing for bankruptcy. Although property
subject to a security interest is property of the debtor's
cured Creditors, 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 555, 578-83 (1995) (discussing case law on
lien avoidance plans). If the debtor-in-possession has not waived the right to avoid
the unperfected cotenancy, then avoidance would be relevant to distribution of the
proceeds of the cotenancy. It would not necessarily go to the power of sale, which
exists under section 363(h) or perhaps under section 363(f). See supra note 363 and
accompanying text.
376. For example, Judge Baldock relied on cases involving unperfected buyers of
accounts who fall to persons, rightly or wrongly, determined to be "lien creditors"
under section 9-301(3). See Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 956 (discussing United States
v. Trigg, 465 F.2d 1264, 1268) (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that the IRS's car lien made
it a "lien creditor" under state law); In re Cripps, 31 B.R. 541, 543 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1983) (holding an unperfected sale of accounts subordinate to a trustee's hypo-
thetical judicial lien under Section 544(a)(1)).
Other cases relied upon by Judge Baldock for the proposition that perfected
sales of accounts are subject to the trustee's turnover powers include Flowers v.
United States (In re Flowers). See Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 956 (citing Flowers v.
United States) (In re Flowers), 78 B.R. 774 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1986)). In Flowers, the
government claimed a security interest in "milk proceeds," but not in the underlying
cows. See Flowers, 78 B.R. at 776. In this case, Judge Bratton Davis also remarked
that, even if perfection had occurred, postpetition milk would be the property of the
estate, under section 552(a). See id. at 776-77. If anything, this case cuts radically
against the result in Octagon Gas, because it indicates that a proceeds-only assign-
ment is disencumbered by the bankruptcy petition. See id. at 776-77. Similarly, the
sale of proceeds on postpetition gas would likewise be disencumbered.
Judge Baldock also cited In re Cawthorn in which the debtor claimed the gov-
ernment had never perfected its security interest in milk proceeds. See Octagon Gas,
995 F.2d at 956 (citing In re Cawthorn, 33 B.R. 119, 121 (M.D. Tenn. 1983)). Judge
John Nixon disagreed, but remarked rather gratuitously: "Even if Tennessee law de-
fined a milk assignment as an absolute transfer of all the debtor's rights in the fu-
ture milk proceeds, § 541(a)(6) would still include these proceeds as property of the
estate." Cawthorn, 33 B.R. at 121 n.2. This dictum might support Judge Baldock if
the assignment of milk proceeds related to the sale of a prepetition account of some
farmers' cooperative to pay for milk produced, but perhaps Judge Nixon was simply
repeating what Judge Davis said in Flowers-that postpetition milk is disencumbered
from prepetition security interests under section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. See
Flowers, 78 B.R. at 776-77. Neither case gives much information about the assign-
ment of milk proceeds.
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bankruptcy estate, secured creditors of the debtor are pro-
vided "adequate protection" for their interest.
377
This language indicates that Baldock did indeed mean to say
that perfected sales of accounts are as much part of the bankrupt
estate as classic perfected security interests in accounts.375
On remand, the bankruptcy court would have determined the
meaning of the plan, given the assumption that Rimmer's co-
tenancy was part of the bankruptcy estate. Under the authority
of section 363(h), the plan was probably capable of selling free
and clear of Rimmer's interest.3 79 But whether the plan actu-
ally gave Octagon good title would depend on the meaning of
the plan itself and also on whether Rimmer received the pro-
tection of due process of law.80 It would thus be necessary for
the debtor-in-possession to have notified Rimmer that the sale
would be free and clear of the cotenancy. The ultimate merit of
Rimmer's action thus probably reduces to a question of whether
the plan intended to sell free and clear and whether Rimmer
received notice and an opportunity to be heard with regard to
the sale.
Octagon Gas has drawn sharp criticism. According to Professor
Thomas Plank: "The court's confused characterization of a sale of
accounts as a security interest in substance has the potential of
destroying the legal foundation for securities backed by automo-
bile loans, trade receivables, equipment leases, and other loans
377. Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 957 n.9 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988)).
378. By way of further evidence, Baldock spent some time disapproving of Dewhirst
v. Citibank (Arizona) (In re Contractors Equip. Supply Co.), in which Judge Albert
Lee Stephens, Jr., upheld the turnover of proceeds from accounts encumbered by the
genuine perfected security interest in accounts. See Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 957
n.8 (citing Dewhirst v. Citibank (Ariz.) (In re Contractors Equip. Supply Co.), 861
F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1988)). In so doing, Judge Stephens remarked in dictum that the
result would have been otherwise had the account been sold. See Contractors Equip.
Supply, 361 F.2d at 245. Baldock's disapproval of this dictum shows that Baldock
did not simply intend to say that unperfected sales of accounts are subject to the
trustee's strong-arm power, but rather, that perfected sales interests are susceptible
to the trustee's turnover power. See Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 957 n.8.
379. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c); see also id. § 363(h) (discussing when a trustee may
sell free and clear of any interest in such property).
380. See Carlson, supra note 375, at 588-93 (discussing a secured party's right to
due process in connection with plan confirmation).
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and leases that are accounts or chattel paper.""8 ' Yet, as demon-
strated, Judge Baldock was justified fully in remanding the case
for findings on what effect the plan had on Rimmer's cotenancy.
Article 9 is certainly part of the story of bankruptcy jurisdiction,
but the cotenancy of Rimmer in a debtor asset also justifies bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction under the provisions of section 363(h).
VII. CONCLUSION
Securitization is a multibillion dollar practice that has grown
up in response to the radical increase in bankruptcy jurisdiction
invoked by the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. Its premise is that sales
of accounts and chattel paper put assets beyond the hypothetical
reach of the originator's bankruptcy trustee. This Article has
shown that the bankruptcy remoteness of these sales cannot be
sustained on either the black letter or on the spirit of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, which requires that secured creditors should contrib-
ute collateral in order to rehabilitate debtors. Because the
drafters of Article 9 intended that there be no difference between
security interests in and sales of accounts and chattel paper, it is
plausible to believe that Congress, in 1979, intended that buyers
of accounts and chattel paper contribute to the rehabilitation of
debtors, just as other secured creditors should. That the securiti-
zation industry wishes to avoid a tax cannot count as an argu-
ment. It is sometimes maintained that only little people pay tax-
es. But not so. The Bankruptcy Code applies to little people and
Fortune 500 companies alike. No one wants to pay taxes; yet, if
Congress says we must, then we must. This principle applies just
as much to securitization as to other forms of secured lending.
381. Plank, supra note 18, at 456-57; see also John C. Chobot, Some Bankruptcy
Stay Metes and Bounds, 99 COl. L.J. 301, 312-15 (1994) (criticizing the uncertainty
caused by the Octagon Gas ruling).
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